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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
A M E R I C A N A G G R E G A T E 
CORPORATION, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
OTTO B U E H N E R & COMPANY, a[
 r . _ p Arn 
corporation, and P A U L B U E H N E R , 1 v-" l b e i > u ' 
Defendants and Respondents, 
vs. 
D. W. B R I M H A L L , 
Additional Defendant on 
Counterclaim, and Cross-Complainant. 
13478 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
N A T U R E O F T H E CASE 
American Aggregate Corporation (a) on its First 
Claim sued its competitor Otto Buehner & Company 
and its president Paul Buehner in tort for unfair trade 
practices, for conversion of 4,000 tons of plaintiff's 
crushed white quartz, on which defendants had ob-
tained from plaintiff a price quotation of $29.50 per 
ton, following which defendants induced plaintiff's in-
dependent crushing contractor D . W . Brimhall to 
1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
accept a purchase order in his own name to sell said 
same aggregate for $20.50 per ton, then hired a carrier 
to haul said materials away from plaintiff's quarry to 
the Buehner plant; and (b) on the Second and Third 
Claims plaintiff sued in contract and in implied con-
tract for plaintiff's quoted price of $35.00 per ton for 
1,124 additional tons obtained by defendant corpor-
ation. 
D I S P O S I T I O N O F CASE 
I N T H E D I S T R I C T COURT 
The trial court declined to grant plaintiff any 
judicial relief under the Unfair Practices Act or for 
unfair trade practices, but "found" that D. W. Brim-
hall, the crushing contractor, was a "joint venturer" 
with plaintiff and authorized to act as "agent" for 
plaintiff to accept the purchase order (in his own 
name) to sell to Otto Buehner & Company at $20.50 
per ton. (R. 857, Ab. 140-141). By the judgment (as 
subsequently modified as to D . W. Brimhall) the 
court limited plaintiff to $20.50 per ton paid to Brim-
hall or paid or "tendered" jointly to plaintiff and 
Brimhall, denied plaintiff damages, interest or costs, 
and dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. (R. 
854-858, 940-942, Ab. 140-144). 
N A T U R E O F R E L I E F S O U G H T 
ON A P P E A L 
By Notice of Appeal plaintiff did not appeal from 
paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the judgment, but from 
paragraphs 1 and 6 which dismissed plaintiff's com-
plaint with prejudice and denied plaintiff costs. Plain-
2 
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tiff also appealed from the judgment by reason of 
failure of the trial court to award plaintiff actual 
damages or adequate compensation, and also failure 
to award punitive damages against defendants Otto 
Buehner & Company and Paul Buehner, or even in-
terest. (R. 943-944, Ab. 144-145). 
On this appeal, on its First Claim, independent of 
claims for treble damages or punitive damages for 
wrongful price-fixing by a competitor, and conversion 
of plaintiff's aggregate, plaintiff seeks recovery in tort 
for damages for the difference between what the court 
allowed in the amount of only $20.50 per ton (without 
consent of plaintiff which was below plaintiff's actual 
costs and which below-cost figure could not legally be 
contracted under the Unfair Practices Act) and plain-
tiff's quoted price of $29.£0 per ton. On the Second 
and Third claims plaintiff seeks recovery of the diff-
erence between $20.50 per ton allowed by the court 
and plaintiff's quoted price of $35.00 per ton, less haul-
ing allowance stipulated as to portions hauled by de-
fendants. Plaintiff also seeks recovery of interest and 
costs. 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E F A C T S 
For many years defendant Paul Buehner has been 
president, general manager and principal stockholder 
of defendant Otto Buehner & Company. No one in 
that company has higher authority. During the time 
in question said corporation was a competitor of plain-
tiff American Aggregate Corporation. Of the latter, 
Richard C. Reimann is president and Don R. Reimann 
is vice-president. The Buehner company also has been 
3 
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engaged in the cast stone manufacturing business, and 
has been a competitor of Style Crete, Inc., in such a 
business. Don R. Reimann has been president of the 
latter. (R. 27-28, 328, Ab. 4, 40, 41). 
Since June 1, 1966, plaintiff has been the lessee of 
mining claims in Section 21, T. 13 N., R. 16 W., SLM, 
Box Elder County. (R. 16-18, Ab. 2). From those 
mining claims and the quarry thereon, for some years 
there has been produced a "milk-white quartz" known 
as Park Valley white quatrz. The crushed quartz ag-
gregate from said property has been used in a number 
of buildings in several States, some by defendant corp-
oration. Some other milk-white quartz is located in 
Virginia. (R. 28, Ab. 4). Plaintiff's officers and em-
ployees did a considerable amount of work at said 
quarry. Richard C. Reimann did the mining and 
crushing. In 1967 D. W. Brimhall, an independent 
crushing contractor, orally agreed to do the mining and 
crushing for plaintiff at his convenience, and be paid 
$10 a ton when the aggregate was sold. The $10 per 
ton included mining, moving equipment, crushing, de-
preciation, and his anticipated profit. (R. 209, 214-
216, 250, 278-279, 333-335, 566-568, 605-606, 620, Ab. 
27-29, 33, 36, 41-42, 80, 86-87, 89-90, 93). 
In 1967 and 1968 Otto Buehner & Company pur-
chased this type of white quartz from plaintiff at the 
regular price of $35 a ton. (R. 30-31, Ab. 4). The 
aggregate mined and crushed by plaintiff in 1966 and 
1967, plus the aggregate mined and crushed by D. W. 
Brimhall for plaintiff starting in 1967, was segregated 
into stock piles. In 1969 the crushed Park Valley white 
quartz was specified as the aggregate for the cast stone 
for the new Church Office building in Salt Lake City. 
4 
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(R. 33-37, Ab. 5 ) . P a u l Buehner before bidding on 
the job asked D o n R. Reimann, vice-president of plain-
tiff for a price quotation on 3,500 to 4,000 tons of the 
specified white quartz aggregate, and was given a 
quotation of $29.50 a ton delivered, which was the same 
price for tha t quantity for all prospective users. After 
Otto Buehner & Company was awarded the cast stone 
contract, Buehner again asked for a quotation, and he 
was given the identical quotation of $29.50 a ton. Bueh-
ner then said that was "too high." H e said, " I can get 
the same material or similar material for around $19.50 
a ton" from a man named Chidester. Reimann said, 
"they couldn't get that material unless they stole it 
from us. I t was specified on the job ." Buehner then 
said he could substitute other material, but D o n Rei-
mann said he talked to the architect and there would 
not be any substitution. H e refused to change the 
quotation. (R. 335-339, Ab. 42-43). 
Buehner took D . W . Brimhall, the crushing con-
tractor, with him to look at some other properties and 
invited him to contract crushing. They then went to 
the American Aggregate quarry. Brimhall showed 
Buehner the stock piles and told him American Aggre-
gate had quoted $29.50 a ton for 4,000 tons; but 
Buehner said he would not pay that much for those 
materials. (R. 216-220, Ab. 29-30). P a u l Buehner 
testified that he told Brimhall tha t the American Ag-
gregate price was too high, and that they would have 
to come down; that "if I didn't get it at my price I was 
going to substitute some other material." H e said he 
had Brimhall go back and forth to American Aggregate 
several times . Buehner told Brimhall to tell D o n Rei-
mann that the price was too high; and that he had 
5 
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better lower the figure. Buehner testified that he asked 
Brimhall to talk to Don and Rich Reimann and see 
if they would lower the price. (R. 44-48, Ab. 6-7). 
Buehner then told Brimhall that he planned to take 
all sizes known as "crusher run". When Brimhall re-
turned with a quotation from American Aggregate of 
$25.50 a ton for "crusher run", and said it was the 
lowest price American Aggregate would take, Buehner 
said, "No deal." H e told Brimhall he could make a 
deal with Chidester for material just as good at $19.50 
a ton delivered, although Buehner knew Chidester then 
did not have a quarry opened up. (R. 49-50, 140-142, 
Ab. 7, 19). 
Buehner testified he had several conversations with 
Brimhall stating that Buehners planned to take crusher 
run. H e said he knew American Aggregate was to 
pay something for crushing, but he did not know what 
the agreement was with D. W. Brimhall. (R. 142-
143, Ab. 19). Brimhall said he told Buehner the Rei-
manns would not go below $25.50 a ton for crusher 
run; that it was their bottom figure; and also that Don 
Reimann might have said that they could not go below 
that figure without "going in the red". Brimhall said 
he told Buehner that was a fair figure for crusher run. 
H e stated that Buehner then said if he could not get 
the material at his price he was "going to have a sub-
stitution." (R. 221-222, 240-244. H e also said that 
Buehner told him if he did not sign a purchase order 
Buehner was going to give Chidester a contract; that 
Paul Buehner offered him $20.50 a ton plus $5,000 
"move-in-cost", and he signed acceptance of Exhibit 
19-P (the Purchase order dated October 17, 1969), 
soon afterwards. H e said he signed acceptance based 
6 
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on the understanding that Buehners were going to take 
"crusher run", but as shown by Exhibit 20-P the said 
purchase order was for selected sizes, not for crusher 
run. (B. 222-225, 608-610, 632, Ab. 30, 88, 92). Said 
Exhibit 19-P was issued only in the name of D . W. 
Brimhall personally. (See Ab. 110-111). American 
Aggregate Corporation was not even mentioned. 
Paul Buehner never sent American Aggregate a 
copy of that purchase order. (B. 147, Ab. 20). Nor 
did Brimhall send a copy. According to Buehner, his 
company already had issued a purchase order to John 
Chidester, October 6, 1969, dated 11-6-69 for a "mini-
mum of 4,000 tons of Park Valley quartz" at $20 a 
ton, Exhibit 15-D. (B. 554, Ab. 78, 108). However, 
that order was canceled within a relatively few days 
without any compensation either just before or shortly 
after Brimhall signed acceptance of Exhibit 19-P and 
20-P. (B. 103A, 554, Ab. 14, 78). Early in November 
1969, Brimhall called plaintiff and said Buehners were 
going to accept the rock from American Aggregate 
quarry. Plaintiff knew defendants had no choice, as 
that was the aggregate specified. (B. 345-346, Ab. 44). 
Plaintiff's quotation of $29.50 a ton included the 
hauling to the Buehner plant. Plaintiff had reserved 
the right to do its own hauling. Brimhall told Don 
Beimann it was impossible for plantiff to deliver all 
the materials before the end of the year, but to start 
hauling. Plaintiff started to haul November 15, 1969, 
but Buehner's plant superintended Marvin L. AUred 
testified he told one of the drivers to stop because there 
was no room in the bins. (B. 345-349, 468, 485, Ab. 
44-45, 65, 69). Undisclosed to plaintiff was the issuance 
on November 11, 1969, of a purchase order from Otto 
7 
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Buehner & Company to Clrak Tank Lines, Exhibit 
5-D, for "Delivery of approximately 4,000 tons fin-
ished Aggregate Park Valley quartz to Otto Buehner 
Company bins." Instructions as to sizes were given 
each day by Mr. Allred to drivers. (R. 52-58, Ab. 7-8). 
When plaintiff failed to receive a purchase order 
by December, plaintiff telephoned for Paul Buehner 
later in the month. Unable to reach him, he was referred 
to someone else. Don Reimann asked "when the pur-
chase order was coming" on the Park Valley white 
quartz. The man at Buehners said, "We have made 
an agreement with Mr. Brimhall. See him about it." 
Since there was royalty payable at $1.50 a ton with a 
rquirement for weight slips and accounting monthly 
showing what had gone out of the quarry, lessor John 
W. Rigby came in several times demanding weigh slips 
and payment. Attempts to reach Brimhall were un-
successful, until January. (R. 349-353, Ab. 45-46). 
When Don Reimann reached him about January 12, 
1970, Brimhall said, " I am afraid I have done some-
thing wrong, but I can't talk about it now. I am 
going on vacation." H e refused to meet until he re-
turned. (R. 353-357, 448-449, Ab. 45-47, 61). Janu-
ary 23, 1970, plaintiff received from Brimhall a check 
for $1,954.41, Exhibit 44-P with notation "royalty 
Park Valley quartz, 1,302.94 tons." Along with it was 
a list of November shipments Exhibit 43-P. (R. 450-
451, Ab. 61, 127-128). 
After unsuccessful efforts to reach Paul Buehner, 
Richard C. Reimann talked to the office manager of 
Otto Buehner & Company, about February 15, 1970, 
and asked when plaintiff was going to receive payment 
on the aggregate. Said Buehner office manager replied, 
8 
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"You are not going to get paid." (R. 451-453, Ab. 61-
62). Don R. Reimann called Clark Tank Lines, talked 
to Ha l Barker and said, " I want you to stop the haul-
ing right now." Barker told him to "go to hell," and 
said that company had a contract with Buehners. (R. 
372-378, Ab. 49-50). Brimhall returned in March, 
1970, and after weeks of delay, plaintiff obtained a 
meeting during the latter part of April or first of 
May 1970. Before that meeting Buehner called Brim-
hall and said he anticipated needing another MB 700 
tons of aggregate. Brimhall testified: " I informed 
him at this time that I had already overstepped my 
bounds with American Aggregate and that I had 
problems, and he would have to negotiate this with 
American Aggregate." Brimhall said any additional 
material would "have to be at a different quote." (R. 
232-233, 291-293, Ab. 31-32, 37). 
At the meeting held the last of April or first of 
May 1970 between Richard C. Reimann, Don R. Rei-
mann, officers of plaintiff, Paul Buehner, president 
of Otto Buehner & Company, and D. W. Brimhall, 
"there were some pretty hot words uttered". (R. 286, 
Ab. 37). Brimhall was apologetic, said he was sure he 
had done something wrong he felt sorry for; but the 
Reimanns said they wanted to know what happened. 
Paul Buehner produced Exhibit 19-P, and asked 
American Aggregate to sign it, but the Reimanns re-
fused. Don said it was not made to American Aggre-
gate; that under no condition would he sign that pur-
chase order "because we never quoted that price. I t 
will be below our cost and we'll not sign it." The Rei-
manns never previously had seen Exhibit 19-P. Don 
Reimann asked Buehner if he was going to make up 
the difference. H e said he would not; that he had a 
9 
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"bona fide purchase order with Brimhall," and he was 
going to hold Brimhall to it; and if any difference had 
to be made up Brimhall would have to pay the differ-
ence. When Brimhall was asked if he could make up 
the difference, he said he couldn't; that it would break 
him. Buehner then said, "you made plenty of money 
at this lower figure. I don't know why you want any 
more." Don Reimann said Buehner had "a lot of guts 
to come in here and tell us how much we can make." 
Rich Reimann asked Buehner if he allowed his janitor 
to sign purchase orders, but Buehner did not answer. 
(R. 153, 154, 358-360, Ab. 20-21, 57). One of the Rei-
manns said plaintiff could not sell the rock at $20.50 
a ton "because it's below our cost." (R. 453-458, Ab. 
62-63). 
After the Reimanns withdrew and conferred, Don 
Reimann then said: Under certain conditions "we 
would not bring suit against Buehner." There were 
four conditions specified: (1) "We had to have weigh 
tickets monthly." (2) "We had to have an accounting 
of payments monthly up to date." (3) "The money 
had to be paid to American Aggregate." (4) Under 
no condition was any more than 4,000 tons to be taken 
out of that quarry, and if it was, it had to be paid at 
the full price of $35 a ton." The accounting had to be 
made every month so plaintiff could settle with lessors 
on royalty. (R. 362-363, Ab. 48). Brimhall's version 
was that "Don said they would not sue if they got a 
proper accounting each month, copies of weigh tickets, 
and payment each month." H e said he didn't deny that 
Don stated that if any material in excess of 4,000 tons 
was taken, it would be at the rate of $35 a ton. (R. 
234, Ab. 32). Paul Buehner testified, "We did all of 
10 
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those conditions", but declined to state any specifics, 
(R. 147, 151-152, Ab. 20). H e said he knew American 
Aggregate claimed ownership of the materials shipped 
to Otto Buehner & Company. (R. 153, Ab. 21). 
Buehner said he promised copies of all weigh tickets 
and said "we have done that." When asked for proof, 
he said he did not handle those matters. (R. 156, Ab. 
21). 
Defendants never furnished plaintiff copies of 
weigh tickets nor rendered any monthly accounting. 
(R. 363, Ab. 48). After repeated requests for weigh 
tickets and accounting Buehner merely sent a letter 
June 16, 1970, Exhibit 25-P. I t disclosed for the first 
time that Buehners already had paid Brimhall $23,-
185.78 as of May 31, 1970. (R. 364, Ab. 48). Otto 
Buehner & Company never even paid Brimhall every 
30 days to comply with Exhibit 19-P. Plaintiff at-
tempted to get weigh tickets and accounting informa-
tion from defendants as well as from Clark Tank Lines 
and Christensen Feed & Seed; but the information was 
inaccurate and far short of the actual amounts shipped. 
Exhibit 7-P sent by Christensen reported only 2,625.59 
tons. Even the "corrected report", Exhibit 21-P showed 
only a total of 3,179 tons. Exhibit 21-P from Clark 
Tank Lines showed a total of only 2,429.78 tons, later 
admitted to be more than 50% short. (Ab. 103-104, 
112-114, 119-121). I t took over a year for plaintiffs 
counsel to get Exhibit 24-P, sent shortly prior to filing 
suit. By it Buehners actually admitted receiving 4,-
913.98 tons (exclusive of what plaintiff had delivered 
by request, aggregating 259 tons). No payment was 
ever made directly to plaintiff. Buehners merely added 
the name of plaintiff to the checks it sent Brimhall 
11 
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after June 28, 1970. Nor were any of the other four 
conditions complied with for refraining from filing suit. 
(R. 367-371, 461-467, Ab. 49-51, 64-65). 
About the first part of June 1970, Paul Buehner 
called Richard C. Reimann and said he needed several 
hundred more tons for another job. Reimann quoted 
Buehner the regular price of $35 a ton. (R. 459-460, 
Ab. 63). About the same time, Marv Allred, Otto 
Buehner & Company plant superintendent, called Don 
R. Reimann and also asked for a price for quartz ag-
gregate. H e also was quoted $35 a ton, which was the 
same price charged in 1967 and 1968. Buehners did 
not issue any purchase order, but plaintiff discovered 
that its aggregate continuedto be hauled away from 
the quarry by Clark Tank Lines or Christensen Feed 
& Seed to the Buehner plant. (R. 367, Ab. 48-49). 
The billing dated December 31, 1970, for additional ag-
gregate was ignored by Buehners, Exhibit 27-P (Ab. 
118). After plaintiff's attorney by letter dated May 
8, 1971, to Otto Buehner & Company indicated suit 
was going to be filed, the Buehner company sent Brim-
hall a check for some "additional aggregate", Brim-
hall returned the check as stated in his letter July 28, 
1971, in response to letter from Thomas A. Duff in 
dated June 17, 1971, Exhibit 34-P. (R. 291-298, Ab. 
37, 125). See Appendix B. Brimhall stated he had no 
authority to quote a price on material for any other 
job. At the trial it was proved by Marvin Allred that 
the shortage of materials complained of was due to the 
fact that Buehners diverted some of the aggregate for 
the Church Office Building job to an entirely different 
job. (R. 485-486, 494-495, Ab. 68-70). 
On July 9, 1970, after Brimhall made certain dis-
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closures to plaintiff he offered settlement and re-
quested that he not be made a defendant in the litiga-
tion with the Buehners. (R. 620-635, Ab. 90-92, 142-
144). 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I. 
T H E " F I N D I N G ' ' T H A T D. W. B R I M H A L L 
W A S A " J O I N T V E N T U R E R ' ' W I T H P L A I N -
T I F F "AND AS S U C H " W A S " A G E N T ' ' F O R 
P L A I N T I F F TO E N T E R I N T O A P U R C H A S E 
O R D E R A G R E E M E N T , W A S P R E J U D I C I A L 
E R R O R ; F O R B R I M H A L L A D M I T T E D 
T H A T H E O P E R A T E D AS AN I N D E P E N D -
E N T L I C E N S E D C R U S H I N G CONTRACTOR 
TO B E P A I D A F L A T C H A R G E O F $10 P E R 
TON F O R M I N I N G A N D C R U S H I N G SERV-
I C E S P E R F O R M E D A T H I S OWN CONVENI-
E N C E , W I T H O U T S H A R I N G L O S S E S W I T H 
P L A I N T I F F ; A N D H E A C T E D A D V E R S E L Y 
TO P L A I N T I F F I N A C C E P T I N G A PUR-
C H A S E O R D E R F R O M A C O M P E T I T O R I N 
H I S OWN N A M E TO S E L L P L A I N T I F F ' S 
A G G R E G A T E B E L O W P L A I N T I F F ' S QUOT-
E D P R I C E S , A N D I L L E G A L L Y AT D E -
F E N D A N T S ' D I C T A T E D P R I C E B E L O W 
P L A I N T I F F ' S COSTS. 
Plaintiff did not join D. W. Brimhall as a de-
fendant, for he convinced plaintiff in a meeting in 1971 
that the reason he signed the "Brimhall purchase order" 
Exhibit 19-P, was because Paul Buehner put a lot of 
pressure on him to sign it, in a way of business dealing. 
(R. 211, Ab. 28). Brimhall testified that Paul Buehner 
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told him that if he did not sign a purchase order, 
Buehner was going to give Chidester a contract; and 
Brimhall signed soon after. (R. 612, Ab. 92). 
No relief is sought against D. W. Brimhall on 
this appeal, inasmuch as the trial court amended para-
graphs 4 and 5 of the conclusions of law and paragraphs 
4 and 5 of the judgment, to conform to the settlement 
agreement he made with plaintiff in July 1970. (R. 
620-635, Ab. 90-92, 142-144). 
D. W. Brimhall admitted that he never was on 
the payroll of American Aggregate Corporation. H e 
testified that from 1960 to 1971 he was a licensed con-
tractor operating on his own, doing custom work for 
various people having crushing work to do, State high-
way contracts, etc; extending over quite an area in 
Utah. (R. 237, Ab. 32). Operating as a general con-
tractor he did custom crushing of all types of materials, 
including quartz, some for American Aggregate. H e 
said crushing this type of material was being done for 
$7 a ton. (R. 215, Ab. 29). However, he later testified 
that the reasonable cost of crushing 1,000 tons of jumbo 
size Park Valley quartz down to number 2 size, at the 
Buehner Plant would range from $2 to $5 a ton, and 
could be in the range of $4. (R. 640, Ab. 93). H e 
testified that on occasion he had gone to the landowner 
and made arrangements for crushing aggregate to 
stockpile it and to hold for future sale, which prompted 
him about 1967 to make an arrangement with American 
Aggregate to move into its quarry in Park Valley and 
crush aggregate there. (R. 566-568, Ab. 80). H e 
entered into an oral agreement with American Aggre-
gate. (R. 209, Ab. 27). He said he had the privilege 
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of moving in any time and crushing when convenient, 
at his own expense. (R. 612-613, Ab. 89). 
Brimhall also testified he was to receive $10 a ton 
when the material was sold. (R. 250, Ab. 33). On de-
position October 5, 1971, he testified: " I would receive 
$10 a ton for my effort in preparing the material." 
That included "whatever was necessary to get it into 
a finished product", including removing overburden, 
mining, crushing, moving equipment, wear on equip-
ment, etc. (R. 214-216, Ab. 28). He admitted that 
the $10 a ton figure included his anticipated profit. 
(R. 605-606, Ab. 86-87). H e admitted also that plain-
tiff never paid him anything in excess of $10 a ton. (R. 
620, Ab. 90). His arrangement was that he was to be 
paid when the sale was made and the money was col-
lected by American Aggregate. H e did not know of a 
single instance when he was not paid that way. (R. 
278-279, Ab. 36). The check dated January 31, 1968, 
for $3,765.39, Exhibit 51-P was based on tonnage sold. 
(R. 601-604, Ab. 86). As to losses, if any occurred, 
"we would have to be responsible for our own particular 
operation." (R. 571, Ab. 81). 
I t was stipulated that plaintiff's lessors had good 
title to the quarry in Section 21, T. 13 N., R. 16 W., 
SLM. Leases to plaintiff were dated June 1, 1966, 
and 1971. (R. 16-18, Ab. 2). During the summer of 
1969 Paul Buehner took Brimhall with him to look at 
some property 18 to 20 miles from the American Ag-
gregate leasehold. Buehner invited him to contract 
crushing. They then went over to the American Ag-
gregate property. Brimhall said he told Buehner he 
was to receive $10 per ton from American Aggregate. 
Brimhall said he told Buehner his relation with Ameri-
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can Aggregate, "That they owned the pit and the op-
eration, and my involvement with them was strictly on 
a crushing preparation." Buehner looked at the stock-
piles. There were between 3,000 tons and 4,000 tons 
in stockpiles, each size in a different pile. (R. 216-
220, Ab. 29-30). Brimhall also told Buehner that 
American Aggregate had quoted a figure of $29.50 a 
ton for 4,000 tons. At one time Paul Buehner told 
Brimhall that he would not pay that amount of money 
for those materials. (R. 220, Ab. 30). 
Brimhall said he had a number of meetings with 
Buehner and tried to negotiate between American Ag-
gregate and Otto Buehner Company. When Buehner 
told Brimhall he was going to take "crusher run", Brim-
hall went back to Rich and Don Reimann (president 
and vice-president of American Aggregate) for a 
price quotation on "crusher run." Brimhall testified 
that the Reimanns quoted a figure of $25.50 for 
"crusher run" for all sizes of materials, before October 
17, 1969; and that American Aggregate would not go 
below $25.50 per ton; that it was their bottom figure; 
and that Don Reimann might have said that they could 
not go below $25 a ton without going in the red. (R. 
240-244, Ab. 32-33). 
Brimhall reported back to Buehner that American 
Aggregate would not go below $25.50 per ton. H e 
admitted that the Reimanns did not give any permis-
sion to go below the $25.50 a ton figure. (R. 242, Ab. 
32-33). Brimhall testified that when he went back to 
Buehner he said that $25.50 a ton was a fair figure for 
crusher run. Paul Buehner then said, "No deal." H e 
said he could get material "just as good" at a lower 
figure; and that if he couldn't get this material at his 
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price, that he was going to have a substitution. (R. 221-
222, Ab. 30) . 
Brimhall admitted that the Reimanns never said, 
"Do the best you can"; that he told Buehner that the 
Reimanns would not consider anything less than $25.50 
a ton, and that Brimhall said it was fair, considering 
costs. Buehner then offered Brimhall $20.50 a ton plus 
$5,000 "move-in" if he would sign a purchase order. 
H e said accepted immediately on the basis that Buehn-
ers would take all sizes. Brimhall said he did not recall 
telling plaintiff that Buehner was going to pay him 
$5,000 to "move-in." H e said he stated definitely to 
P a u l Buehner that American Aggregate would not go 
below $25.50 for crusher run. (R. 608-610, Ab. 88) . 
Brimhall testified that he did not tell P a u l Buehner 
that he was an officer to sign any contracts for Ameri-
can Aggregate. W h e n Exhibit 19-P was presented to 
him by Buehners he was conscious of the fact that it 
did not contain the name of American Aggregate Corp-
oration at all. (Ab. 110-111). H e knew American 
Aggregate had quoted $29.50 a ton for selected sizes, 
and that Otto Buehner & Company did not take all of 
the sizes; and that he signed Exhibit 20-P designating 
particular sizes. (R. 222-224, Ab. 30) . 
Brimhall said he told Buehner that American Ag-
gregate had a lease on the quarry. H e did not deny 
that he told Buehner that American Aggregate owned 
the materials at the quarry. (R. 225, Ab. 30) . H e said 
that P a u l Buehner told him that he was going to give 
Chidester a contract if Brimhall did not sign the pur-
chase order, and that he signed soon after that . (R. 
632, Ab. 92) . 
Defendant P a u l Buehner, called as an adverse wit-
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ness, admitted that he knew that Park Valley white 
quartz was specified as the aggregate for the cast stone 
for the new Church Office Building in Salt Lake City; 
that the samples approved by the architects had been 
taken out of the American Aggregate quarry; and the 
mock-up for the architects was made of this approved 
material, and not taken from any adjoining land or any 
other place. (R. 33-37, Ab. 5) . 
Buehner admitted that on deposition he testified 
that when Brimhall mentioned American Aggregate's 
quotation, he told Brimhall that the "price was too 
high" and that he had better tell Don Reimann that the 
price was too high and "to lower the figure." He said 
he asked Brimhall to talk to Don and Rich Reimann 
to see if they would lower the figure. After some dis-
cussions, Buehner told Brimhall that Buehners planned 
to take all sizes or what was known as crusher run; 
that it would make considerable difference with the 
Reimanns in the quotation. When American Aggre-
gate then quoted $25.50 a ton for "crusher run", 
Buehner told Brimhall, "No deal." Buehner knew that 
there was no other quarry opened up, but he told Brim-
hall he could make a deal with Chidester for "material 
just as good" for $19.50 a ton delivered. (R. 48-50, 
Ab. 6-7). 
Don R. Reimann, vice-president of American Ag-
gregate, testified that when American Aggregate took 
over the quarry in 1966, it was hazardous. The road 
into it was very narrow, and considerable work had to 
be done . H e and other men worked there for the corp-
oration. His brother Richard (Rich) worked there 
many days, doing the mining and crushing. In 1967 
Brimhall told them he could do the crushing easier be-
1S 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
cause he had much larger equipment; that he would 
crush the material at his convenience and be paid $10 
a ton when American Aggregate sold the material and 
received the money. (R. 333-335, Ab. 41-42). Brim-
hall agreed to that, and they operated on that basis. 
(R. 331-335, Ab. 41-42). 
During the summer of 1969 Paul Buehner met with 
Don, and said "Your quartz is specified on this job" 
referring to the Church Office Building job. Don told 
Paul the price always had been $35 a ton, but Paul 
Buehner asked for quotation on a large quantity. On 
3,500 to 4,000 tons Don quoted $29.50 a ton delivered. 
That quotation was not made exclusively for Otto 
Buehner & Company, but for everyone. (R. 334-335, 
Ab. 42). In September 1969 after Otto Buehner & 
Company was awarded the cast stone contract, Paul 
Buehner again asked Don R. Reimann for a quotation, 
and Don again quoted $29.50 a ton for that same ton-
nage, which was the same quotation to everyone for 
that quantity. (R. 336-337, Ab. 42). Buehner said it 
was "too high." H e falsely represented he could pur-
chase that same material or similar material from a man 
named Chidester for $19.50 a ton. " I said they couldn't 
get that material unless they stole it from us. I t was 
specified on the job." Paul Buehner also said they 
could substitute materials, but Don Reimann said he 
talked to the architect and was told they would not 
allow any substitutions. (R. 337-339, Ab. 42-43). 
When Brimhall came to American Aggregate and 
said it would have to knock the price down, because 
Buehners claimed they could get the material cheaper 
from another source, American Aggregate refused to 
lower its quotation. Later Brimhall came back and 
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asked Don and Rich Reimann if they would lower 
their price if Buehners took "crusher run" which is 
everything that comes from the crusher without segre-
gation into stockpiles. American Aggregate then told 
Brimhall it would sell the aggregate at $25.50 for 
"crusher run", but under no condition would it sell 
under that figure. (R. 340-344, Ab. 43). Obviously, 
Brimhall conveyed the message and that message came 
through to Paul Buehner and his corporation loudly 
and clearly that the Buehners were not going to dic-
tate prices of their competitors. American Aggregate 
knew that its aggregate had been specified and that no 
one else had that kind of material, so there was no need 
to meet a price on some inferior unspecified and unac-
ceptable material. Paul Buehner then proceeded to 
work on Brimhall, the crushing contractor, to pressure 
him into agreeing to sell plaintiff's aggregate at a 
figure below plaintiff's costs behind the backs of plain-
tiff's officers. 
I t is obvious that there was no "joint venture" 
agreement between American Aggregate and its crush-
ing contractor, D. W. Brimhall. This Court has held 
repeatedly that under Utah law a joint venture is a 
partnership generally limited to a single transaction. 
Forbes v. Butler, 66 Utah 373, 242 P . 950, 946. In 
Koumans v. White Star Gas k Oil Co., 92 Utah 24, 
63 P.2d 231 it was held that a joint venture is subject to 
the law of partnership. In Bates v. Simpson, 121 Utah 
165, 239 P . 2d 749, it was held that a joint venture, 
being in the nature of a partnership, cannot arise except 
by consent of the parties under an agreement to share 
profits and losses. Brimhall expressly disclaimed any 
duty to share any losses of plaintiff. H e testified that 
20 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
he was to get $10 a ton when the aggregate was sold 
and American Aggregate collected the money. H e 
charged a very substantial premium of $3 a ton over the 
general price of $7 a ton for those crushing services in 
that area, and it should be remembered that contractors 
doing the same job at $7 a ton were expecting the $7 
a ton to net them a profit, or they would not have 
been engaged in that kind of business. F o r whatever 
delay might occur, Brimhall was not only getting the 
profit on $7 a ton, when he said crushing actually cost 
from $2 to $5 a ton, but also taking a profit of $3 for 
the delay period which would be equivalent to 25% in-
terest a year. The claim that he should get a profit 
"over the $10" was not mentioned until after suit was 
started, nor months after. Brimhall talked American 
Aggregate into omitting him as a defendant in the law-
suit. Brimhall's fee for everything he did was a flat 
charge of $10 a ton. H e did not have to share any loss 
American Aggregate might have to suffer. Accord-
ing to his testimony he explained to P a u l Buehner 
that he was to get $10 a ton. 
Section 48-1-3, U . C. A. 1953, Uniform Par tner -
ship Act (which has been judicially applied to "joint 
ventures") , specifies: 
" A partnership is an association of two or more 
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for 
profit." 
As pointed out in Stillwell v. Trutanich, 3 Cal. 
Rp t r . 285, 288, 178 C. A. 2d 614, in a joint venture the 
parties not only share in the profits, but also in the 
losses. Brimhall made it clear that he was to get $10 
a ton although it involved a considerable profit. Tha t 
was for himself. H e also said that if there were losses, 
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each one would take care of that on his own operations, 
so he demonstrated there was no joint venture. There 
was no agreement to share either losses or profits be-
tween plaintiff and Brimhall. Brimhall had his own 
separate business as a licensed independent contractor 
doing custom crushing for a number of parties. He had 
his own machinery and equipment. He also had his own 
employees. Plaintiff had no ownership interest in his 
business. Brimhall told Buehner that American Ag-
gregate owned the quarry, and the materials at the 
quarry. Brimhall was not on American Aggregate 
payroll. H e admitted he had no authority to sign any 
contracts for American Aggregate. Brimhall certainly 
was not a co-owner of the aggregate business. 
Under the provisions of Section 48-1-6, even if a 
partnership or joint venture exists, a partner or joint 
venturer can act as an agent to bind the partnership or 
joint venture if he executes a document in the partner-
ship name or joint venture name. A partner or joint 
venturer cannot bind the partnership or joint venture 
by merely signing some document in his individual 
name. Exhibits 19-P and 20-P (Ab. 110-111), were 
issued by Otto Buehner & Company to D. W. Brim-
hall personally. They did not purport to be issued to 
any joint venture as defendant tried to torture the in-
struments to read by violation of the Parol Evidence 
Rule. Nor did Brimhall purport to sign for American 
Aggregate Corporation. If Paul Buehner had honestly 
believed (which he did not) that Brimhall was engaged 
in a joint venture with American Aggregate with 
authority to sign for American Aggregate, he would 
not have neglected to have Brimhall sign for American 
Aggregate Corporation. 
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N o purchase order could have been signed in the 
name of a joint venture, because none ever came into 
existence. W h e n defendants prepared Exhibits 19-P 
and 20-P, they did not thereby pretend that plaintiff 
was par t of a "joint venture." Those two exhibits did 
not even mention American Aggregate Corporation 
nor even refer to it, nor provide for it to receive any 
par t of the fraudulent sale price for Plaintiff 's ma-
terials. The $5,000 illegal inducement to Brimhall to 
accept the purchase order from Otto Buehner & Com-
pany to sell plaintiff's goods below plaintiff's costs, 
under the pious label of "move-in-costs", obviously wTas 
not payable to plaintiff. Buehner admittedly never sent 
plaintiff a copy of Exhibit 19-P and 20-P because that 
would have exposed the fraud being perpetrated on 
plaintiff. (The $10 a ton payable by plaintiff to Brim-
hall when the aggregate was sold, included moving in 
and out of the proper ty) . Defendants Buehner knew 
they had to have the materials out of the plaintiff's 
quarry, for that was the only place defendants knew 
that the milk-white quartz specified for the Church 
Office Building job could be obtained, except in Vir-
ginia. (R. 28, Ab. 4 ) . 
The trial court made a finding of "agency" of 
Brimhall based solely on the erroneous finding that 
there was a "joint venture". There was no joint venture 
because Brimhall was to receive a fixed price of $10 a 
ton when the aggregate was sold and plaintiff collected 
the money, and he was not to share any loss with plain-
tiff. Consequently, there was no agency. However, if 
there had been a joint venture, the purchase order 
would have had to be signed in the name of the joint 
venture in order to bind plaintiff, not in the name of 
Brimhall alone. 
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Brimhall had no authority to execute any purchase 
order on behalf of plaintiff. Exhibit 19-P does not 
purport to be executed for or on behalf of the plaintiff, 
since it does not even refer to plaintiff. Consequently, 
when defendants raised defenses of "agency" and also 
pretended that plaintiff "approved" the Brimhall "pur-
chase order", plaintiff interposed by affirmative de-
fenses, motions and objections, (a) the Statute of 
Frauds, and (b) the attempt to vary and contradict the 
express terms of Exhibit 19-P by parol evidence. (R. 
734, 739, 839-842). The trial court first deferred rul-
ing thereon, then ruled in effect against the plaintiff by 
findings of fact. The court erred prejudicially by such 
adverse rulings and findings, when plaintiff's name was 
not even mentioned on Exhibit 19-P. The findings 
amount to a unilateral amendment of said document 
against the will of plaintiff which was the injured party. 
Assuming arguendo that plaintiff had made Brim-
hall an agent (which plaintiff did not do), plaintiff by 
its officers had the sole right to fix prices for its ma-
terials. Plaintiff quoted defendants prices of $29.50 a 
ton for milk white quartz of selected sizes, and $25.50 
a ton for "crusher run". Brimhall knew that plaintiff 
refused to go below those prices, and Brimhall told 
Paul Buehner that plaintiff would not lower its prices. 
Since defendants knew that plaintiff had refused to go 
below those prices, if Brimhall had signed acceptance of 
a purchase order in the name of plaintiff, when he had 
no authority to sign any contracts, he would have been 
acting adversely to his principal, and acting outside the 
scope of his authority particularly if he had signed a 
contract to sell for less than plaintiff's quoted prices. 
An agent has no authority to overrule his principal nor 
defy his principal's lawful decisions. 
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However, Brimhall did not act as an "agent" of 
plaintiff in signing Exhibits 19-P and 20-P in his own 
name at the request of defendants in spite of Buehners' 
false representations that they were going to take 
"crusher run". If Brimhall was acting as an agent for 
anyone, he was acting as an agent or tool or instru-
mentality for a competitor of plaintiff and to the detri-
ment of plaintiff. Paul Buehner admitted under oath 
that after he received plaintiff's price quotation of 
$29.50 a ton for selected sizes, he said he would not pay 
that much for those materials, and inferentially that 
he was going to dictate plaintiff's prices, knowing that 
Otto Buehner & Company had to have plaintiff's milk 
white quartz aggregate for the cast stone because it was 
specified, and the architects would not allow any sub-
stitution. Buehner not only told Brimhall to tell plain-
tiff's officers Rich and Don Reimann that their price 
was "too high", but he told Brimhall to tell them they 
would have to lower the prices, and that if he could not 
buy the material at his price, he would substitute some 
other materials. (R. 45, Ab. 6). Buehner thereby 
threatened to cheat and defraud The Church as owner 
of the building project and the prime contractors. 
Buehner knew he had no right to dictate the prices of 
a competitor, nor to substitute unspecified materials. 
Then Buehner, as he admitted under oath "had Mr. 
Brimhall go back and forth to American Aggregate 
Corporation several times." (R. 45, Ab. 6). For whose 
benefit? Certainly not for plaintiff. Buehner then 
falsely represented that his company was willing to 
take "crusher run", and he told Brimhall "to find out 
what kind of a quote" plaintiff's officers would give on 
"crusher run." When Brimhall came back with a quot-
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ation from plaintiff of $25.50 a ton for "crusher run", 
with the message that plaintiff would not accept any-
thing less, Buehner arrogantly declared, "No deal." 
Buehner knew then that plaintiff would not accept a 
purchase order at a price lower than plaintiff's quota-
tions, so the Buehners decided to circumvent plaintiff 
altogether by working on Brimhall to induce him not 
merely to accept in his own name behind the backs of 
plaintiff's officers a purchase order for less than plain-
tiff's quoted prices, but at defendants' dictated price 
of $20.50 which was below plaintiff's costs. 
Although the court repeatedly sustained objections 
to attempts to prove the total amount of plaintiff's costs, 
Brimhall himself testified that among the costs were, 
$10 a ton to himself when the aggregate was sold, $1.50 
royalty per ton, and $8 a ton estimated hauling charge 
to Salt Lake City. Said three items alone totaled $19.50 
per ton or only $1 a ton less than the sale price in Brim-
hall's purchase order. The following additional costs 
and expenses chargeable to the cost of the aggregate 
obviously would raise the total costs to at least $4 or $5 
above the $20.50 figure dictated by the Buehners: (a) 
salaries and wages of officers and employees of plain-
tiff, (b) employer taxes ,(c) thousands of dollars spent 
to meet the safety requirements of the Industrial Com-
mission, (d) depreciation on plaintiff's machinery and 
equipment used at the quarry, (e) cost of operation of 
such equipment while at the quarry, (f) annual local 
taxes on machinery and equipment at the quarry, (g) 
accounting fees and record keeping, (h) legal fees, and 
(i) miscellaneous costs. 
The trial court committed prejudicial error in dis-
regarding the facts and the law by finding and con-
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eluding that Brimhall was a "joint venturer with the 
plaintiff" and "as such was authorized to act as an 
agent for" plaintiff and to "enter into the purchase 
order agreement" when he did not even pretend to act 
as agent nor for the benefit of plaintiff when he signed 
Exhibits 19-P and 20-P. Defendants did not intend 
Brimhall to sign as a joint venturer or for American 
Aggregate Corporation, when defendants prepared 
those documents behind the backs of plaintiff's officers, 
in order to obtain plaintiff's aggregate at a price below 
plaintiff's costs by a deal made personally with Brim-
hall. The court also committed prejudicial error in dis-
missing the complaint with prejudice, when defendants 
themselves proved they were engaged in an unlawful 
scheme to appropriate a competitor's property to the 
use and benefit of defendants to unjustly enrich them-
selves to the further detriment and damage of plaintiff 
by causing plaintiff to suffer a loss. 
P O I N T I I . 
T H E COURT E R R E D P R E J U D I C I A L L Y I N 
F I N D I N G T H A T P L A I N T I F F SUBSE-
Q U E N T L Y " R A T I F I E D " T H E UNCONS-
C I O N A B L E P U R C H A S E O R D E R B E T W E E N 
OTTO B U E H N E R & COMPANY A N D BRIM-
H A L L , F O R SUCH D O C U M E N T S E C R E T L Y 
E X E C U T E D TO D E F R A U D P L A I N T I F F , A 
COMPETITOR, COULD NOT L E G A L L Y B E 
R A T I F I E D U N D E R T H E P R O V I S I O N S O F 
T H E U T A H U N F A I R P R A C T I C E S ACT. 
The trial court did not sign any pretrial order, but 
allowed each party to proceed on its or his own pro-
posed pretrial order. (R. 1-3, Ab. 1). As shown by the 
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First Claim of plaintiff in its proposed revised pretrial 
order, plaintiff sued in tort for unlawful acts of de-
fendants as competitor of plaintiff, for hauling away 
4,000 tons of milk white quartz by a scheme amounting 
to unfair competition and unfair trade practices. (R. 
817-822). 
Among other things, appellant contends that Ex-
hibit 19-P, to which plaintiff never was a party, was 
an illegal price-fixing agreement between defendants 
and Brimhall, the crushing contractor, and illegal and 
void under Title 50, Chapter 1, U. C. A. 1953, with 
plaintiff as the victim. By defendants' own admissions, 
after defendants refused to accept plaintiff's price quot-
ations for plaintiff's good, defendants entered into an 
illegal agreement with Brimhall by an illegal induce-
ment to pay him $5,000 to sign such illegal agreement, 
thereby fixing the price behind the backs of plaintiff's 
officers for the sale of goods not only below plaintiff's 
quoted prices, but below plaintiff's costs. 
Plaintiff contends that Exhibit 19-P, was an illegal 
agreement, void under the provisions of the Utah Un-
fair Practices Act, Title 13, Chapter 5, U. C. A. 1953. 
The pertinent provisions are quoted with certain por-
tions italicized in Appendix A to this brief. Contrary 
to the court findings, plaintiff did not see Exhibit 19-P 
until about May 1, 1970, then refused to sign it because 
it not only was below plaintiff's quoted prices, but even 
below plaintiff's costs. Section 13-5-7 makes it unfair 
competition for any person to sell or offer to sell mer-
chandise either as a wholesaler or retailer, at less than 
cost, to injure a competitor. The term "cost" shall 
"include the cost of raw materials, labor and all over-
head expenses of the producer." As hereinabove stated, 
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overhead expenses included a number of items of cost, 
which brought the cost at least above $20.50, and ac-
cording to the estimate of plaintiff's officers in 1970, 
about $25.00 per ton. Section 13-5-3 makes it unlawful 
to discriminate in price between purchasers of com-
modities of like grade and quality, to lessen competition 
or injure, destroy or prevent competition with any per-
son who either grants or knowingly grants or receives 
the benefit of such discrimination. Subsection (f) 
makes it unlawful for any person knowingly to induce 
or receive a discrimination in price. Section 13-5-6 
specifies that any person who as a director, officer or 
agent of a firm aides directly or indirectly in violating 
the provisions of the chapter, is equally responsible with 
the corporation or firm for which he acts. Consequently, 
P a u l Buehner, as president, general manager of Otto 
Buehner & Company who engineered the illegal and 
unconscionable violations, was joined as a defendant, 
for he master-minded the illegal acts. 
Section 13-5-13 declares that 
"Any contract, expressed or implied, made by 
any person, in violation of any of the provisions 
of this act is declared to be an illegal contract 
and no recovery thereon shall be had." 
If plaintiff had actually attempted to ratify such 
an outrageous contract designed to fleece plaintiff, the 
ratification would have been void, for such a contract 
being illegal cannot be ratified, because Section 13-5-17 
states that the creation of monopolies and unfair and 
discriminatory practices are against public policy. 
W e incorporate under this Point I I the evidence 
and argument under Point I , and we supplement the 
facts from the record herein to show the vicious and 
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overreaching character of the illegal scheme to swindle 
the plaintiff; also the deceit and subterfuge employed 
in the cover-up, including the misleading and false re-
ports to prevent plaintiff from learning about what was 
taking place behind the backs of its officers for as long 
a time as possible. 
On his disposition Paul Buehner made a number of 
admissions, some of which have heretofore been cited, 
but at the trial he attempted to explain them away or 
contradict them. We believe that his admissions on de-
position in addition to his admissions at the trial con-
stitute an estoppel by oath. On deposition Buehner 
testified that he knew it had been the practice all along 
to give the aggregate sizes to the crushing contractor. 
(R. 156, Ab. 21). At the trial he tried to argue that he 
understood that Don R. Reimann said he could negoti-
ate with Brimhall; but he told only a half truth, for 
Don testified that he said he could negotiate with Brim-
hall as to sizes of the aggregate Buehners would take. 
(R. 365, Ab. 48). 
Defendant Paul Buehner as well as plaintiff's 
president and vice-president, Richard C. and Don R. 
Reimann, knew that the Park Valley White quartz 
from plaintiff's quarry was specified as the aggregate 
for the cast stone for the new Church Office Building 
in Salt Lake City in 1969. The Buehners formerly had 
an interest in that quarry. Paul Buehner testified that 
there was some other milk white quartz located in Vir-
ginia. (R. 28, Ab. 4). Buehner knew that after 
American Aggregate Corporation leased the quarry, his 
company had purchased some of that milk-white quartz 
from plaintiff at $35 a ton, as shown by Exhibit 4-P 
(R. 30-31, Ah. 4). When Paul Buehner in September 
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1969 asked Don R. Reimann, vice-president of plaintiff 
for a quotation on 3,500 to 4,000 of the white quartz, he 
was given a quotation of $29.50 a ton delivered; but 
Buehner, whose company had been paying $35 a ton 
declared that it was "too high". Buehner falsely repre-
sented that he could get either the same material or 
similar material from a man named Chidester. Don 
Reimann answered that "they couldn't get that ma-
terial unless they stole it from us. I t was specified on 
the job." (R. 338, Ab. 42). Buehner then falsely rep-
resented he "could substitute materials." Such at-
tempted deceit-scare-tactics did not work on Don Rei-
mann, for he told Buehner he had talked to the archi-
tect and found out there would be no substitution. Con-
sequently, plaintiff refused to lower its quotation. (R. 
339-340, Ab. 42-43). 
Buehner as manager of a competitor of plaintiff, 
used a quotation of $19.50 a ton from Chidester for 
material not specified and not acceptable on the job. 
Such attempted leverage designed to force plaintiff to 
lower its price, was part of the subterfuge involving 
unfair and deceitful tactics to obtain discrimination in 
price for the type of material specified and approved 
by the architects. I t also was part of an illegal price-
fixing scheme for defendants to fix and control plain-
tiff's prices. The defendants Buehner well-knew they 
had to have the Park Valley milk-white quartz from 
plaintiffs quarry to comply with an existing contract, 
because it was the only place where it was being pro-
duced in Utah; and defendants knew that they could 
not legally substitute any other material. Except for 
some pieces of "float" there was no milk-white quartz 
then available on State-owned lands in Section 22 al-
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legedly under the control of Chidester, to the east of 
plaintiff's quarry in Section 21. 
Section 13-5-8 makes it unlawful for any person 
engaged in business to "advertise goods, wares or mer-
chandise they are not prepared to supply." Chidester 
could not have advertised that he was able to supply 
the P a r k Valley milk-white quartz specified for the 
Church Office building job, not only because he had 
no rights in plaintiff's quarry where the architect's ap-
proved aggregate was produced, but for the further 
reason no one ever submitted to the architect for ap-
proval any sample of materials which might possibly 
be produced on the leaseholds to the east under the 
control of Chidester. If Buehners had entertained any 
belief that they could have obtained approval, they 
would not have failed to submit such samples. 
Donald G. Prince, a geologist employed by the 
Division of State Lands (admitted to be qualified as 
to the nature of the stone in question), testified that 
for a number of years he had searched the State lands 
in Section 22 to ascertain the different colors of quartz. 
I t was admitted that Exhibit 3-P, a sample of the P a r k 
Valley white quartz (known as milk-white quartz) 
came from plaintiff's quarry in Section 21. (R. 18, 
Ab. 3 ) . Prince said the only place he found that white 
material was in Section 2 1 ; that as you get into Section 
22 the material becomes buff or t an colored. (R. 10-
14, Ab. 1-2). 
John W . Rigby, one of the locators of the mining 
claims in Section 21 who leased to American Aggregate 
Corporation in 1966, has been familiar with the area 
for 13 years. H e testified that this milk-white quartz 
of which Exhibit 3-P is a sample, with the commercial 
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name of "Park Valley White Quartz", ends at the east 
end of Section 21; that after many weeks of explora-
tion lands to the east, except for some float, the quart-
zite to the east of Section 21 is gray, gray-white, and 
with an opaque luster. (R. 16-20, Ab. 2-3). This may 
illustrate why Paul Buehner did not even bother to 
submit any samples from the Chidester leaseholds. 
Even John Chidester himself, although he testified 
that there is a "certain similarity" between Exhibit 3-P 
and materials on his State leaseholds, admitted he had 
no experience in identifying materials; never produced 
any aggregate; never had any comprehensive test or 
chemical analysis made of those materials; never sub-
mitted any sample to the architect for approval, nor 
had any of the quartz on his leaseholds crushed to see 
how it would appear for whiteness; but he knew that 
the material on American Aggregate property in Sec-
tion 21 was "designated by the architect". (R. 105-110, 
Ab. 14-15). Chidester said there are many types of 
white quartz; that white quartz crops out in three 
places.... that a lot of quartz looks white at a distance. 
H e said there was some opaque material there, some 
with rust-colored stain in the fissures; also some green 
quartz, gray quartz, and other types, also some black 
rock, some of which gets into the white quartz; and 
some buff colored material on both sides of the fence. 
Some exposed material up there has a sheen, and some 
is closer to a sugar-type quartz, with what appears like 
a calcite sheen. (R. 111-120, Ab. 15-16). I t is no 
wonder that neither Chidester nor Buehner tried to get 
the architect to approve any sample of those materials 
as a substitute for the materials produced on plaintiff's 
properties which were specified by the architect. 
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After Buehner failed to succeed in getting plaintiff 
to respond to his enormous price chiseling to get a dis-
criminatory price for Otto Buehner & Company, he de-
cided to work on D. W. Brimhall. Buehner admitted 
he "had Mr. Brimhall go back and forth to American 
Aggregate Corporation several times." H e told Brim-
hall to tell Don and Rich Reimann that their price was 
"too high", and to tell them they "would have to come 
down" on the price; and that if he didn't get that ma-
terial at his price, he was "going to substitute some 
other material." (R. 45, Ab. 6). Buehner then falsely 
represented to Brimhall that instead of taking selected 
sizes the Buehners were going to take "crusher run", 
and for Brimhall to find out what kind of a quote they 
would give on "crusher run". (R. 45, Ab. 6). Brimhall 
came back with a quotation from plaintiff of $25.50 a 
ton for crusher run, and Buehner said, "No deal." (R. 
48-49, Ab. 7). Buehner falsely represented that he 
could make a deal with Chidester "for material that was 
just as good at 19.50 a ton delivered." Buehner knew 
Chidester did not even have a quarry opened up at that 
time. (R. 50, Ab. 7) . Buehner said he also told Brim-
hall that he could get the same kind of material some 
other place. (R. 141, Ab. 19). Buehner knew that 
representation was false. 
Buehner said he then had several conversations 
with Brimhall before making out the purchase order, 
including the statement that he planned to take crusher 
run. Buehner admitted he did not know what agree-
ment Brimhall had with American Aggregate, but he 
knew Brimhall was to be paid for crushing the rock. 
(R. 143, Ab. 19). Buehner testified that during the 
conversation with Brimhall he told Brimhall he would 
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give him $5,000 "move-in cost", over and above the 
25.50 or 20.50 a ton. (R. 565, Ab. 80). Buehner ad-
mitted that he prepared Exhibit 19-P, purchase order 
to Brimhall, and also Exhibit 20-P specifying sizes. He 
also admitted that there was no statement in those 
documents about crusher run. (R. 144-146, Ab. 19). 
Buehner thus induced Brimhall to sign a different deal 
from what he had negotiated, since he negotiated for 
"crusher run." The Buehners never even sent American 
Aggregate Corporation a copy of the purchase order. 
(R. 147, Ab. 19-20), obviously because they did not 
want American Aggregate to know of the unconscion-
able fraudulent deal he had signed with Brimhall to 
deprive plaintiff of its materials. 
The secret transaction between the Buehners and 
Brimhall reeks with illegal price fixing and unfair 
trade practices to the injury and detriment of plaintiff. 
Both Brimhall's version and Buehner's representation 
of what occurred showed a design to illegally appropri-
ate plaintiff's aggregate for the benefit of Otto Buehner 
& Company. Defendants Buehner knew it would be 
futile to ask Amreican Aggregate Corporation to accept 
a purchase order to sell selected sizes of Park Valley 
White Quartz aggregate for $20.50 a ton when it had 
quoted $29.50 a ton for the quantity in question for the 
job instead of the regular price of $35.00 a ton, par-
ticularly after plaintiff quoted $25.50 a ton for "crusher 
run" (which the Buehners never intended to take), and 
then stated positively that American Aggregate would 
not go below that last figure for crusher run. Brimhall 
knew plaintiff would not accept a purchase order from 
the Buehners for $20.50 a ton because plaintiff already 
had told him it could not go below $25.50 a ton without 
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going in the red. (R. 240-244, Ab. 32-33). Even if 
Brimhall believed Buehner's false representation that 
he would substitute other materials or get the same ma-
terials elsewhere, the Buehners themselves knew they 
could not substitute, and that Otto Buehner & Company 
could not perform its contract for manufacture of the 
cast stone for the new Church Office building without 
using plaintiff's P a r k Valley Whi te quartz specified 
as the aggregate. Buehner also knew that no one else 
had that aggregate available except plaintiff, a com-
petitor of his company. 
Brimhall's version was that Buehner said he would 
give Brimhall $20.50 a ton plus $5,000 "move-in," and 
that he accepted it immediately, and that it was on the 
basis of crusher run. (R. 608-609, Ab. 88) . Brimhall 
also said that P a u l Buehner told him that if he did not 
sign a purchase order, he (Buehner) was going to give 
Chidester a contract. (R. 632, Ab . 92) . Buehner said 
he already had issued a purchase order to Chidester, 
and that Brimhall wanted to make a deal; and that 
Buehner then said he would give "a little bit more." 
(R. 554, Ab. 78) . However, the Chidester deal was 
par t of a subterfuge on the par t of the Buehners, for 
almost immediately after Brimhall signed Exhibit 19-P 
the Chidester purchase order Exhibit 15-D was can-
celed. Chidester testified that Buehner asked for can-
celation within 2 to 4 days after it was signed, and that 
it was canceled without compensation. (R. 103A, Ab . 
14). 
The trial court committed prejudicial error in over-
ruling plaintiff's objections to Chidester's testimony, 
(most of which was hearsay), and to the incompetent 
and irrelevant Exhibit 15-D. Such evidence was offered 
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under the sham defense of "reasonable value" of plain-
tiff's aggregate, when there was no production from the 
Chidester leaseholds, and it was not the same material 
on which plaintiff had quoted, nor the same material 
specified. Such conduct demonstrated an unlawful de-
termination to fix plaintiff's price. The objection that 
such defense was sham, should have been sustained, for 
there was no right to substitute such unproduced ma-
terials. The plaintiff had the right to quote prices for 
its materials without interference from defendants. De-
fendants had no right to seize plaintiffs materials from 
plaintiffs quarry, and haul them away to satisfy a con-
tract, then dictate to plaintiff a lesser price below plain-
tiffs quoted price, particularly a price below plaintiffs 
costs. Counsel for plaintiff objected from the beginning 
that defendant's conduct constituted unfair trade prac-
tices, and unfair competition in violation of law. Nor 
did the trial court have any right to fix plaintiff's prices 
below plaintiff's quotations nor condone the defendants' 
illegal price fixing below plaintiff's costs. 
Defendants obviously recognized that the Chidester 
deal was not one whereby the Buehners could perform 
the cast stone contract which required the use of ma-
terials from plaintiff's quarry. We repeat, if Buehners 
had used such unallowable substitute material, it would 
have been a fraud on the Church as owner of the build-
ing, as well as on the general contractor. The Chidester 
plan was a highly impracticable theory, so the Buehners 
obviously knew it would not work even if the substitu-
tion had been allowable. Chidester admitted that in-
stead of crushing at the quarry he would open up, he 
would haul the rock to Salt Lake County for crushing, 
and that it would take 1/3 more rock because of wast-
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age, with 1/3 greater hauling charges, and 1/3 more 
royalty, as well as opening a quarry late in the fall and 
quarrying or mining during the winter. (R. 115-116, 
122-127, Ab. 15-17). Chidester erroneously assumed 
that the yellow stains on his rock could be removed by 
acid. (R. 127-128, Ab. 17) . 
Brimhall, of course, did not send plaintiff a copy 
of Exhibit 19-P, obviously because legal proceedings 
would have been instituted immediately to stop the 
looting of plaintiff's quarry. Instead, he called plaintiff 
and stated that Buehners were going to accept the rock 
from American Aggregate quarry, which certainly did 
not come as any surprise, for plaintiff's officers knew 
that Otto Buehner & Company had no choice. (R. 345-
346, Ab. 44) . Then early in November 1969, Brimhall 
called about hauling. The hauling was included in the 
quotation of $29.50 per ton, and it was to be done by 
American Aggregate . Brimhall said Buehners had to 
have all of the material by the first of the year, and 
that American Aggregate could not possibly haul all 
of it. Don Reimann said his company wanted to haul 
as much as possible. Brimhall suggested gett ing bids 
from truckers. Each called some truckers, Brimhall 
said to get up to the quarry and start hauling as quickly 
as possible. Don Reimann started hauling November 
15th. I t was necessary to have weigh tickets to satisfy 
the lessors for payment of royalty. (R. 346-349, Ab . 
44-45). Marvin L . Allred, Buehner's plant superin-
tendent, stated that he told one of the drivers for 
American Aggregate Corporation in November 1969 
that he should not haul in any more material at that 
time because the bins were crowded. (R. 468, Ab. 65, 
R . 485, Ab. 69) . This was par t of the cover-up to get 
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plaintiff involved and apparently designed to make 
plaintiff a party to the illegal operation without any 
disclosure of the secret illegal and fraudulent purchase 
order to Brimhall. 
Plaintiff did not even find out until the time of 
trial, that on November 11, 1969, Otto Buehner & 
Company issued a purchase order to Clark Tank Lines, 
Exhibit 5-D for "Delivery of approximately 4,000 tons 
finished Aggregate Park Valley quartz to Otto Bueh-
ner Company bins," for $7.55 per ton. Clark Tank 
Lines then sublet to Gaylen Christensen of Tremonton. 
H . E. Barker, then director of sales said the Buehner 
Company issued said purchase order. Instructions as 
to size were given by Mr. Allred, each day. (R. R. 
52-58, Ab. 7-8). 
Plaintiff's officers anticipated receiving a purchase 
order from Otto Buehner & Company, soon after haul-
ing started, on the basis of $29.50 per ton, since selected 
sizes were being hauled to the Buehner plant. (R. 399, 
415, Ab. 53, 56). Plaintiff had previous experience 
with Otto Buehner & Company on delay of a purchase 
order until after partial delivery, September to De-
cember 1967, Exhibit 4-P, which stated: "This is the 
total amount needed including those amounts already 
shipped." Those materials in 1967 were billed at the 
regular price of $35 a ton. (R. 423, Ab. 57, 97-101). 
When no purchase order arrived seasonably, Don 
Reimann called Paul Buehner's office in December, 
1969, but was unable to contact him. When the call 
was not returned, about the end of December or first 
part of January, Reimann called again and was re-
ferred to someone else at the Buehner company office. 
He asked to talk with someone about Park Valley 
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quartz, Reimann asked when the purchase order was 
coming. The one on the phone at Buehners' said, " W e 
have made an agreement with Mr. Brimhall. See him 
about it." (There was no pretense of an agreement 
with plaintiff). Mr . Rigby had come into plaintiff's 
office in December several times and demanded weigh 
slips showing what was going out of the quarry, for 
royalty had to be paid on a monthly basis. None had 
been received. (R. 349-353, Ab. 45-46). 
Don Reimann then endeavored to reach Mr. Brim-
hall early in January , but he was unsuccessful at first. 
When he finally reached him about J a n u a r y 12, 1970, 
D o n Reimann told Brimhall he had been told by 
Buehners that they had made an agreement with him 
of some kind; also, that Rigby had come in demanding 
weigh slips and royalty, and it was necessary to have 
an accounting on what had been shipped. Reimann told 
Brimhall he wanted to talk to him, and wanted to know 
what had happened. Brimhall said, "Z am afraid I have 
done something wrong, but I can't talk about it now. 
I am going on vacation." Brimhall was asked to cancel 
his vacation because they ought to know what t ran-
spired ; but Brimhall said Don would have to wait until 
he returned. (R. 353-357, Ab. 45-77). 
Richard C. Reimann, president of plaintiff, also 
attempted to call Pau l Buehner early in J anua ry 1970, 
was unable to reach him, left his number to call back, 
but the call was not returned. Rigby came into the 
office again, upset because he had not been paid royalty. 
H e made threats. Rich Reimann reached Brimhall by 
telephone while Rigby was still there, and said, "Rigby 
is in here and he is going to shut down that pit unless 
we have some payment on royalty. I have no idea what 
40 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
has been delivered." Brimhall said he would get a 
check for what had been hauled out of there, and weigh 
tickets too. When asked to come to a meeting, Brim-
hall said he could not meet then because he was going 
to Mexico. Brimhall did not furnish any information 
before he left. (R. 448-449, Ab. 61) . 
On Janua ry 23, 1970, plaintiff received from 
Brimhall a check for $1,954.41, Exhibit 44-P "royalty 
P a r k Valley quartz 1,302.94 tons." Along with it was 
merely a list of November shipments to Otto Buehner 
& Co., Exhibit 43-P showing a total of 1,302.94 tons, 
with a signed statement of Brimhall, " I will see that 
a copy of delivery tickets are sent to you." (Ab. 127-
128). Those two documents were received after Brim-
hall left. (R. 450-451, Ab. 61) . 
About the middle of February 1970, Richard C. 
Beimann called Pau l Buehner's office, but was unable 
to reach him; then he asked to talk to someone about 
the P a r k Valley quartz coming into Buehners for the 
Church Office Building. H e was connected with the 
office manager. Beimann identified himself as the 
president of American Aggregate Corporation, and 
said, "This rock has been coming out of P a r k Valley 
for the Church Office Building. I would like to know 
when we are going to receive payment on this." The 
office manager of Otto Buehner & Company answered, 
"You are not going to get paid." (R. 451-453, Ab. 
61-62). This illustrated the determination of defend-
ants to divest plaintiff of possession of its properties 
and pay plaintiff nothing for it, which was unlawful 
and fraudulent, as well as a combination of unfair 
t rade practices. 
Near the middle of February Don Reimann called 
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Clark Tank Lines and spoke to Hal Barker. Reimann 
told Barker that Clark Tank Lines had gone onto 
American Aggregate property and hauled out rock; 
that the property did not belong to the Buehners nor 
to Brimhall, and "I want you to stop the hauling right 
now." Barker told him to "go to hell." He said, "We 
have a contract with Buehners to haul, and if you inter-
fere we'll sue you." Later, a copy of a letter addressed 
to Paul Buehner from Clark Tank Lines dated June 
22, 1970, Exhibit 6-P was received. The court erron-
eously excluded said letter. (R. 372-378, Ab. 49-50). 
Hal Barker, director of sales for Clark Tank Lines, 
admitted having a conversation about January 1970 
with Don Reimann, who asked who gave authority to 
haul materials belonging to American Aggregate Corp-
oration down to Otto Buehner & Company; that Bueh-
ners had no authority to take any materials out of 
there. He said Exhibit 6-P (Ab. 134) contained his 
signature by someone else in the office. He said Clark 
Tank Lines took orders from Otto Buehner & Com-
pany, and never sent any copies of weigh tickets to 
American Aggregate. (R. 65-71, Ab. 9). 
After Brimhall returned in March or April, Don 
Reimann attempted to reach him to get a meeting with 
him and Paul Buehner, but there was difficulty in 
getting Buehner to a meeting. However, in April be-
fore the meeting was held, Paul Buehner called Brim-
hall and said he anticipated needing another 700 tons 
of aggregate. Brimhall said he would have to get in 
touch with American Aggregate Corporation and make 
a deal; and that any additional material would have 
to be at a different quote. As stated on deposition: 
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"I informed him (Paul Buehner) at this time 
that I had already overstepped my bounds with 
American Aggregate and that I had problems, 
and he would have to negotiate this with Ameri-
can Aggregate." (R. 232-233, 291-293, Ab. 31-
32,37). 
In the meantime, American Aggregate was frus-
trated in its efforts to obtain information as to tonnage 
going out the quarry. I t was unable to obtain any 
weigh tickets or accounting information to settle royalty 
with the Rigbys. After Brimhall returned to Utah the 
Reimanns complained to him that a lot of material was 
being taken out without any report, and Brimhall ad-
mitted they complained because they could not get 
weigh tickets or accounting. He said he called Paul 
Beuhner to get some reports. (R. 246, Ab. 33). When 
a meeting was finally arranged it was held about May 
1, 1970, at the Style-Crete office, between Richard C. 
Reimann, Don R. Reimann, Paul Buehner and D. W. 
Brimhall. According to Brimhall, "there were some 
pretty hot words uttered at that meeting." (R. 286, 
Ab. 37). 
Don R. Reimann testified that at the beginning of 
the meeting Brimhall was apologetic, said he was sure 
he had done something wrong he felt sorry for. Don 
and Rich Reimann said they wanted to know what had 
happened. Paul Buehner produced the purchase order 
Exhibit 19-P. That was the first time it was seen by 
Don or Rich Reimann, and the first time they learned 
the price on it. Buehner asked American Aggregate 
to sign it, but Don and Rich Reimann refused. Don 
said it wasn't made to American Aggregate and they 
never quoted that price. Don asked Paul Buehner if 
he was going to make up the difference. H e said that 
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he had a "bona fide purchase order with Brimhall", 
and he would not make up the difference, and if the 
difference had to be made up, Brimhall would have to 
pay the difference. (Under the Unfair Practices act, 
that purchase order was illegal, and Buehner could not 
enforce it against anyone). When Brimhall was asked 
if he would make up the difference, he said he couldn't, 
that it would break him. Buehner then said, "you made 
plenty of money at this lower figure. I don't know why 
you want any more." Don Reimann told Buehner he 
"had a lot of guts to come in here and tell us how much 
we can make." Don also said that under no condition 
would plaintiff sign that purchase order, "because we 
never quoted that price . . . I t will be below our cost 
and we'll not sign it." (R. 358-360, Ab. 47-48). 458, 
Ab. 47-48, 63). 
Richard C. Reimann testified that Buehner said 
that Don had told him to get in touch with Brimhall, 
but Don said that only had to do with the sizes of the 
rock. Don also said, "You know Paul, that you bought 
rock from us before, and that we have quoted you a 
price on the same rock before. Now how could you 
sign up an agreement with a purchase order with De-
Mar Brimhall?" Richard said he asked Buehner, "If 
I was to come down to your plant, Paul, and ask you 
about a particular piece of cast stone, and you told 
me to refer to somebody in your shop and I did, would 
I make a purchase order with your man at the shop or 
make it out to Buehner & Company?" Buehner did not 
answer. Richard stated that either he or Don said they 
"could not sell the rock at 20.50 a ton because it's be-
low our cost." (R. 453-458, Ab. 62-63). 
After Brimhall said he was unable to pay the diff-
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erence, Don and Rich Reimann withdrew and con-
ferred with each other. Then Don said that under cer-
tain conditions "we would not bring suit against Bueh-
ners." There were four conditions: (1) " W e had to 
have weigh tickets monthly." (2) " W e had to have an 
accounting of payment monthly up to date." (3) "The 
money had to be paid to American Aggregate ." (d) 
Under no condition was more than 4,000 tons to be 
taken out of that quarry, and if it was it would be at 
the full price of $35 a ton. Don said he was very 
emphatic about it. H e said they had to have an ac-
counting every month so they could settle royalty with 
Rigby. (R. 360-363, Ab. 48) . Rich Reimann related 
the same conditions, under which "we would not press 
charges or sue, if certain conditions were met." (R. 
456-458, Ab. 63) . Rich Reimann testified also that 
Brimhall said several times that "Pau l was not to use 
this rock on any other job ." 
Brimhall testified that he heard the Reimanns say 
at the meeting that they were going to refrain from 
suing Otto Buehner & Company if they did certain 
things, and one of them was to produce the weigh 
tickets. (R. 623, Ab. 90) . Earl ier he testified that at 
such meeting Don said they would not sue if they got 
a proper accounting each month, copies of weigh tickets, 
and payment each month. Brimhall said he didn't deny 
tha t Don stated that if any material in excess of 4,000 
tons was taken, it would be at the rate of $35 a ton. 
(R. 234, Ab. 32) . 
Pau l Buehner said he could not recall asking the 
Reimanns to sign the purchase order at that meeting 
about the first of May. A t first he denied that any 
conditions for not filing suit were mentioned, then 
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stated: " W e did all of those conditions," but when 
asked when, he hedged starting with the item of ac-
counting. (R. 151-152, Ab. 20) . H e testified that he 
promised to furnish copies of all weigh tickets and as 
to tonnage hauled, and said "we have done that ." When 
asked when, he was evasive and said he did not handle 
those matters. (R. 156, Ab. 21) . H e said he knew 
that American Aggregate claimed ownership of the 
materials that were shipped to Otto Buehner & Com-
pany. H e admitted that on deposition he testified that 
at said meeting he stated that whatever difference there 
was between American Aggregate Corporation's quoted 
price and Brimhall, Brimhall would have to take care of 
i t ; that he had a signed contract with Brimhall, and 
that he was "going to hold him to it." H e also admitted 
that Rich Reimann asked him if he was in the habit of 
letting his jani tor sign purchase orders for him. (R. 
153-154, Ab. 21) . 
Defendants never did render any monthly ac-
counting, and never gave plaintiff any weigh tickets. 
(R. 363, Ab. 48) . After repeated requests, P a u l Bueh-
ner said he would take care of it, but merely sent a 
letter dated J u n e 16, 1970, Exhibit 25-P which dis-
closed for the first time that D . W . Brimhall had been 
paid $23,185.78 as of May 31, 1970. (R. 364, Ab. 48) . 
The actual tonnage delivered by Clark Tank Lines was 
not stated, merely the 1978.66 tons hauled for which 
Buehners had paid for hauling, which was found 330 
tons short in 1971 when plaintiff's counsel finally ob-
tained from Otto Buehner & Company's legal counsel 
shortly before suit, Exhibit 24-P, whereby it admitted 
it had received 4,913.98 tons through Clark Tank Lines 
(exclusive of the 259 tons received directly from plain-
tiff and never paid for ) . 
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Exhibit 25-P disclosed that Otto Buehner & Com-
pany already had paid to Brimhall $23,185.78. Not 
having paid anything to plaintiff, and having stated 
to plaintiff's president, "You are not going to be paid," 
defendant manifested an intent and design to take 
plaintiff's materials without paying plaintiff anything 
for them, to the unlawful and unjust enrichment of 
defendants. Until June 29, 1970, Otto Buehner & 
Company did not even add plaintiff's name to the 
checks. Even after the meeting the first of May or 
last part of April 1970, Paul Buehner manifested con-
tempt for plaintiff and for plaintiff's property rights 
by paying directly to Brimhall, notwithstanding one of 
the conditions plaintiff's officers stated for refraining 
from bringing suit, was the payment of the money each 
month to plaintiff. (Brimhall had no right to collect 
any money from any purchaser under his agreement 
with plaintiff, but was to be paid by plaintiff when 
plaintiff collected the sale price). 
I t is significant that defendants never even com-
plied with the conditions they wrote into the purchase 
order issued to Brimhall, Exhibit 19-P, (Ab. 110), 
which specified that "90% of the value of material will 
be paid within 30 days of receipt of same." Defendants 
never paid any attention to that except possibly on the 
first payment made in January 1970. Otto Buehner & 
Company took the attitude that it would comply if and 
when it saw fit to do so. 
Defendants were well aware of the fact that plain-
tiff had to pay royalty monthly of $1.50 per ton to 
the Rigbys on all materials hauled out of the quarry, 
and to furnish copies of weigh slips and a monthly 
accounting. Defendants knew that by withholding 
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copies of weigh slips and the accounting information 
from plaintiff as to tonnage being hauled out of the 
quarry they were subjecting plaintiff to the hazard of 
having its lease on the quarry canceled. If defendants 
planned and designed to have plaintiff's lease on that 
quarry canceled (from which defendants were hauling 
away the aggregate by their own contract carriers), 
they could not have done more to accomplish such an 
objective than what defendants did in persistantly 
withholding the information P a u l Buehner admittedly 
promised, but never furnished. Unt i l shortly prior to 
the filing of suit, defendants did not condescend to make 
that information in Exhibit 24-P available. 
Plaintiff met with frustration time after time in 
t rying to obtain that information from Clark Tank 
Lines and from Christensen Feed & Seed, which did 
the hauling for the Buehners. W h e n plaintiff finally 
got a purported list of loads hauled to Buehners (not 
weigh slips) from the latter in the fall of 1970 after 
defendants stopped hauling, only 2,625.59 tons were 
reported by Exhibit 7-P. Even the "corrected" report, 
Exhibit 28-P, showed only 3,179.055 tons. Clark Tank 
Lines as of September 25, 1970, issued Exhibit 21-P, 
showing a total of only 2,429.78 tons, which later was 
admitted to be more than 50% short. (Ab. 103-104, 
112-114, 119-121). Plaintiff's officers were forced to 
wade through a maze of false and misleading inform-
ation for over a year in efforts to find out what had 
been taken out of the quarry by defendants. (R. 367-
371, 461-467, Ab. 49-51, 64-65). 
Defendants Buehner never complied with any of 
the four conditions plaintiff specified for refraining 
from filing suit: N o weigh tickets were ever furnished, 
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there was no monthly accounting at any time, and no 
list of loads hauled out even given until 14 months 
later, payment never was made directly to plaintiff, 
and what payments were made on the 4,000 tons prior 
to June 29, 1970, were made solely to Brimhall, and 
after that date the name of plaintiff was merely added 
to the checks sent to Brimhall, but no payments were 
made monthly. In fact the last two checks for a total 
of $8,830.42 although dated July 7, 1970, were not 
received by Brimhall until March 25, 1971. (R. 548-
549, Ab. 77). 
The trial court committed prejudicial error in find-
ing that plaintiff "by actions subsequent to the sign-
ing of the Purchase Order Agreement, ratified and 
accepted the said Purchase Order Agreement." (R. 
857, Ab. 140). There was no competent evidence of 
any "ratification", and under the provisions of the Un-
fair Practices Act, since the conduct of defendants in-
volved illegal price-fixing on plaintiff's goods, and a 
sale by Brimhall below plaintiff's costs, and other 
fraudulent and unfair practices. There could not have 
been any "ratification"; for plaintiff refused to sign it, 
because it was below plaintiff's quoted price and below 
cost. A further reason is, plaintiff merely promised to 
refrain from suing defendants if the defendants would 
comply with four conditions, none of which defendants 
ever complied with. 
First of all, the doctrine of "ratification" applies 
only when an agent does some unauthorized act for the 
benefit of his principal. Jones v. Bank of America Nat. 
Trust & Savings, 49 Cal. App. 2d 115, 121 P.2d 94, 
98. Brimhall was not the agent of American Aggregate 
Corporation. Furthermore, what he did was done ad-
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versely to plaintiff and for the benefit of defendants. 
As hereinabove pointed out, Brimhall was used as an 
instrumentality or tool by the Buehners to cheat and 
defraud the plaintiff and to unjustly and illegally en-
rich the Buehners. This Court in Jones v. Mutual 
Creamery Co., 81 U t a h 223, 17 P . 2d 256, 259, 85 
A . L . R. 908, held that "ratification" is the adoption 
by one person of an act in his behalf by another, acting 
as his agent without authority. The one who is charged 
with "ratification" must be provided with all of the 
material facts. I n this case for a long period of time 
the facts were concealed. A t the meeting about May 
1, 1970, the officers of plaintiff flatly refused to sign 
or approve the fraudulent purchase order, Exhibit 
19-P, because it purported to be a sale of plaintiff's 
materials by Brimhall who was unauthorized, at a sale 
price $9 below plaintiff's quotations of $29.50 to de-
fendants, and even below plaintiff's costs. Tha t con-
duct on the par t of Brimhall and defendants was not 
only detrimental and financially ruinous to plaintiff, 
but it was designed to unlawfully and unjustly enrich 
defendant Otto Buehner & Company, a competitor of 
plaintiff. 
Furthermore, on the face of the record, Exhibit 
19-P was a subterfuge, for P a u l Buehner admitted that 
his company was going to take "crusher run", but the 
outrageous purchase order was for "selected sizes," 
and it contained an illegal inducement of $5,000 to 
Brimhall (undisclosed to plaintiff) to sell plaintiff's 
aggregate behind the backs of plaintiff's officers at a 
price illegally dictated by defendants, below plaintiff's 
costs; and that purchase order was in the name of 
Brimhall with all money payable to Brimhall. Conse-
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quently it was the worst species of fraud. Defendants 
expressly refused payment to plaintiff and made all 
payments to Brimhall down to June 29, 1970. 
The plaintiff had no duty to refrain from suing 
after defendants ignored the four conditions named by 
defendants for not bringing suit. The testimony of 
Paul Buehner that his company complied with those 
conditions was patently false, when neither he nor his 
company complied with any of them. 
I t is appropriate to quote from the concurring 
opinion of Mr. Justice Wolfe in Ralph A. Badger & 
Co. v. Fidelity Building & Loan, 94 Utah 97 at 126, 
75 P . 2d 669, in a situation in which the defendant loan 
corporation circumvented the certificate holder and de-
pressed the market and resorted to subterfuge, but the 
trial court found no design to defraud: 
". . . If this were the case, it presents a plain 
case of overreaching. A principle quite ultimate 
has been violated. A debtor so actively mislead-
ing the creditor to the benefit of the one and the 
detriment of the other would be violating a most 
fundamental legal concept and one which reaches 
back to the moral law crystalized in the Ten 
Commandments. 
"The trial court before which the facts of this 
case were fully presented found these issues 
against plaintiff, and that there was no scheme 
or intention on the part of defendant to mis-
state facts or defraud plaintiff. . . . Under such 
circumstances, even though the result came from 
an innocent or careless impartation of informa-
tion followed by the subsequent acquisition of 
plaintiff's certificate and not from a deliberate 
design on the part of the defendant, the de-
fendant debtor cannot profit from his creditor. 
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For such restitution of this loss was the complaint 
filed, and such restitution do we decree" (Italics 
added) . 
Although this Court held that the defendant could 
not obtain unjust enrichment with judicial approval 
even if the statements made by defendant were not de-
signed to defraud, there can be no doubt that Pau l 
Buehner intended to defraud plaintiff, not only by de-
ceit and threats involving a claim that other materials 
would be substituted when he knew there was no sub-
stitution allowable, but Buehner used cunning tech-
niques to get possession of plaintiff's materials without 
paying plaintiff's quoted price. W h e n Buehner could 
not succeed in his chiseling tactics with Don Reimann, 
he started to use Brimhall. Brimhall was his tool. Ot to 
Buehner & Company had to have the American Aggre-
gate Corporation's P a r k Valley milk-white-quartz 
crushed aggregate in order to comply with the terms of 
a cast stone manufacturing contract, and the Buehners 
were illegally determined to get that material not 
merely without paying plaintiff its quoted price, but 
by dealing behind the backs of plaintiff's officers to 
get the materials at their dictated price which they had 
no legal authority to dictate to a competitor. 
Without detailing how many of the Ten Command-
ments were violated we wish to remark that those com-
mandments, ancient as they are, have become imbedded 
in our secular law. Several years ago when a magazine 
writer declared that the Ten Commandments "ought 
to be revised", Richard L . Evans responded by saying, 
"they ought to be re "•read." I n ordering removal of the 
Ten Commandments monolith from the approach to the 
Courts Building in Salt Lake City, Chief Judge Ri t ter 
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of the Federal Court in Utah scoffed at the idea that 
those commandments have any place in our secular law, 
with some implications that they are religious concepts 
out of date. In reversing him in Anderson et al. v Salt 
Lake City et al, 475 F.2d 29 (1973), the U.S. Court 
of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, noted that "the Decalogue 
is at once religious and secular, and that the "monolith 
is primarily secular". The Unfair Practices Act 
adopted formally in 1937, was based on ancient legal 
concepts, to prevent unfair trade methods and unfair 
competition. Sharp traders who conjure up schemes to 
get the goods of a competitor not only below quoted 
prices, but even below his costs, when there is not out-
right stealing, there are manifestations of dishonesty. 
First, they covet that which does not belong to them, 
and seek to obtain unfairly the profit included in the 
quoted price which the owner of the goods is legally en-
titled to receive. Many people do not hesitate to prac-
tice deceit in overreaching, all of which was condemned 
as far back as the Mosaic Code: "Thou shalt not de-
fraud they neighbor, neither rob him", etc. (Leviticus 
19:15). 
"Overreaching" is not only defined in the Badger 
case, but in other decisions. In re BarucJis Will, 132 
N. Y. S. 2d 402, 405, the term was construed to mean 
to overdo, or to get the better of a person in a trans-
action by cunning and cheating, or by sharp practice. 
Many years ago, the courts adopted the doctrine of 
quasi-contract, whereby it was held that if a person takes 
the goods of another, the fact that he might not intend 
to pay for the goods at all or what they are worth, does 
not relieve him of liability, for equity compelled just 
compensation by requiring payment of the market price, 
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so that a party could not profit from his own wrong or 
unjustly enrich himself to the loss or detriment of his 
adversary. As pointed out in the Badger case, a party 
may not unjustly enrich himself to the detriment of 
another in a business transaction, even if there is no 
deliberate design on the part of the one unjustly en-
riched to accomplish such detrimental result to the in-
jured party. 
The modern doctrine of "Restitution" and "unjust 
enrichment", are invoked even if no fraud is actually 
intended. Hiocon v. Allpin, 76 Idaho 327, 281 P . 2d 
1042, 1045. Under Restatement of the Law, Sec. 1 a, 
"Restitution", a person is unjustly enriched if the re-
tention of the benefit would be unjust. The Restate-
ment is quoted in Baugh v. Darley, 112 Utah 1, 184 
P .2d 335, 337, 338, that there is unjust enrichment 
where one retains money or benefits which in justice 
and equity belong to another. 
Inasmuch as there was no innocent conduct on the 
part of defendants, but an outright design to cheat and 
defraud the plaintiff, and an actual scheme to get the 
plaintiff's goods without paying for them, this is an ag-
gravated case of overreaching illegal conduct by de-
fendants. The trial court committed prejudicial error 
in dismissing plaintiff's complaint, and by so doing in-
f erentially condoned the illegal and unconscionable con-
duct of the avoracious defendants. 
I I I . 
P L A I N T I F F W A S NOT L E G A L L Y B O U N D 
BY T H E " B R I M H A L L P U R C H A S E ORDER' ' 
W H I C H P L A I N T I F F N E V E R S I G N E D NOR 
A P P R O V E D , B U T T H E COURT P R E J U D I C -
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I A L L Y I M P O S E D ON P L A I N T I F F A CON-
TRACT TO A L L O W D E F E N D A N T S TO OB-
T A I N 4,000 TONS A T D E F E N D A N T S ' DIC-
T A T E D P R I C E , P L U S A D D I T I O N A L AG-
G R E G A T E F O R O T H E R JOBS B E L O W 
P L A I N T I F F ' S Q U O T E D P R I C E S A N D E V E N 
B E L O W COSTS. 
Plaintiff never executed the fraudulent and illegal 
Brimhall ''purchase order", but stated that it would 
refrain from suing if defendants complied with four 
specified conditions; but defendants never complied 
with any of them. However, the court not only found 
that plaintiff was bound by the $20.50 per ton price 
dictated by defendants to Brimhall, but even condoned 
the taking of additional tonnage at the below-cost price 
of $20.50 a ton for the extra tonnage. If a competitor 
cannot legally dictate the prices at which an owner 
sells his goods, by virtue of Title 50, Chapter 1 and 
by Title 13, Chapter 5 (Unfair Practices Act) , then 
neither can the court do so to benefit and unjustly en-
rich such illegally operating competitor, nor decree that 
the owner shall sell his goods to a competitor not only 
below the owner's quoted prices, but even below costs 
to thereby subject the owner to financial ruin. 
One of the four conditions specified by the Rei-
manns at the meeting held about May 1, 1970, for re-
fraining from suing the Buehners was that not more 
than 4,000 tons would be taken, and that if any more 
were hauled away the price would be the regular price 
of $35 a ton. Before that meeting Brimhall already 
had told Paul Buehner when Buehner said he antici-
pated needing another 700 tons, that it would have to 
be at a "different quote", and to get in touch with the 
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Reimanns. Brimhall testified he informed P a u l Bueh-
ner "that I had already overstepped my bounds with 
American Aggregate and that I had problems, and he 
would have to negotiate this with American Aggre-
gate." (R. 233-234, Ab. 31-32). 
About a month after the aforesaid meeting when 
the four conditions for refraining from suing were speci-
fied by plaintiff, P a u l Buehner called plaintiff's presi-
dent Richard C. Reimann and said he needed several 
hundred more tons for another job (B . Y . U.) Reimann 
quoted Buehner the regular price of $35 a ton. (R. 459-
460, Ab. 63) . About the same time, Marv Allred, plant 
superintendent for Otto Buehner & Company, called 
D o n R. Reimann and asked for a price for the quartz 
aggregate. H e also was quoted $35 a ton, which was 
the same price charged in 1967 an d!968. Buehners did 
not issue any purchase order, but plaintiff discovered 
that its aggregate continued to be hauled away from the 
quarry by Otto Buehner &; Company. Nevertheless, 
plaintiff continued to be frustrated in its efforts to 
obtain weigh slips from the Buehners, Clark Tank 
Lines, and from Christensen Peed & Seed. None were 
ever furnished. (R. 367, Ab. 48-49). B y request some 
materials had been hauled by Roland Fawson, May 28, 
29, J u n e 1 and 15, 1970; but the Buehners would not 
acknowledge receipt, although he furnished the weigh 
slips. (R. 300-319, Ab. 38-39). ( I t was stipulated 
that the total tonnage delivered by plaintiff was 170 
plus 89 or a total of 259 tons. (R. 318, Ab. 39) . The 
billing by plaintiff December 31, 1970, Exhibit 27-P 
(Ab. 118), was in error by reason of incorrect inform-
ation given plaintiff by Clark T a n k Lines. 
The court erroneously sustained objections to E x -
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hibit 22-P, dated May 8, 1971, a letter from Paul E . 
Reimann, counsel for plaintiff admittedly received by 
Otto Buehner & Company; and also the belated letter 
of response fro mThomas A. Duffin, Exhibit 23-P, 
dated June 15, 1971, although Paul Buehner admitted 
that someone else in the company authorized him to 
write it. (R. 165-169, Ab. 22-23, 135-136). Counsel 
for plaintiff received Exhibit 24-P prepared by Otto 
Buehner & Company shortly prior to the time in 1971 
when suit was filed. (Ab. 114). Defendants continued 
to ignore plaintiff's demand for payment, but after 
plaintiff's counsel sent Exhibit 22-P, the latter part of 
June 1971 Otto Buehner & Company sent a check to 
Brimhall for some "additional aggregate", thereby 
acknowledging that the Buehners actually had obtained 
materials in excess of 4,000 tons. Even if the Buehners 
had met the first three conditions under which plaintiff 
would forebear to sue (which the Buehners failed to 
perform), the fourth condition was that all aggregate 
taken in excess of 4,000 tons would be at the regular 
price of $35 a ton. 
Brimhall received a letter from Thomas A. Duf-
fin dated June 17, 1971. Exhibit 34-P dated July 28, 
1971, was Brimhall's respense, set out in full in Ap-
pendix B. By said letter Brimhall stated that "Pur-
chase Order # U 09868, Job # 9-267 was for the job 
I negotiated for. Approximately 4,000 ton for the 
Church Office Building." Brimhall also stated that 
" I told him [Paul Buehner] I had no authority to sell 
or quote a price on material for any other job or jobs 
and that he would have to negotiate with Mr. Don Rei-
mann." Brimhall returned the check sent by Otto 
Buehner & Co. (R. 291-298, Ab. 37, 125). Defendants 
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did not see fit to tell plaintiff that they sent such a 
check to Brimhall, apparently hoping to be able to 
compromise plaintiff by gett ing Brimhall to accept it. 
I t is significant that Brimhall testified that he wrote 
in longhand on his deposition: 
"Don Reimann told Mr. P a u l Buehner that 
they could not have material for any other job 
for the same price as the Church Office Building 
order." (R. 615, Ab. 89) . 
Exhibit 19-P was issued solely in the name of 
Brimhall, with all money payable to Brimhall, and with 
all performance by Brimhall as "seller" to be made by 
Brimhall. Counsel for defendants at the trial distorted 
the following provision of Exhibit 19-P argue that it 
entitled defendants to get additional aggregate at 
$20.50 a ton for other jobs : 
" I n the event additional material is needed 
said D. W. Brimhall will furnish said quantities 
of aggregates to Otto Buehner & Co. within 30 
days of notice of same by O B C to Mr. Brimhall, 
his successors or assignees, and at the same price 
as the original order and under said provisions 
as to quality." (Italics added) . 
The above provision was doubtless copied from 
other forms which are designed to avoid leaving the 
purchaser short on the particular type of material for 
the Particular job quoted, and could only have referred 
to the Church Office Building job No . 9-267 stated in 
Exhibit 19-P, but even the court misconstrued it. I f 
there were an ambituity or uncertainty, the document 
would have to be construed against the Buehners who 
prepared it. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Morton, etc., 
450 F . 2d 493. 
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Otto Buehner & Company in its second claim in 
its amended counterclaim acknowledged that the above 
quoted provision only related to the Church job, for de-
fendant falsely alleged that it needed some additional 
material of designated sizes for the Church Office 
Building job and notified American Aggregate and 
Brimhall, but they "refused" to deliver it. (R. 715). 
The Buehner company made the fictitious claim that it 
was "damaged" $7,000 by having to crush larger sizes 
of materials. Buehners knew they had contracted with 
Clark Tank Lines to haul away 4,000 tons of plaintiff's 
aggregate (Exhibit 5-D); that defendants had com-
plete control of the hauling of the 4,000 tons; and that 
the Buehner employees instructed the drivers what sizes 
to haul. (R. 52-59, 63-66, 187, Ab. 7-9, 25). To illus-
trate the falsity of the claims and testimony of de-
fendants, for over a year Buehners would not divulge 
to plaintiff what the Buehners had obtained, but de-
fendant Buehner company continued to help itself to 
such sizes of aggregate as Buehners decided to take 
away from plaintiff's quarry. At the trial it was ad-
mitted that the Buehners had changed the sizes of ag-
gregate they decided to use. (R. 469-470, Ab. 65). By 
its own neglect and bungling operations, Otto Buehner 
& Company left at the quarry at least 200 tons of the 
sizes it claimed it needed, and in consequence of which 
it falsely claimed it had to crush 1,000 tons of jumbo 
size. (R. 342, 497-502, Ab. 43, 71). To further illus-
trate the deceitful character of the defendants' evidence, 
on cross-examination Marv Allred, plant superintend-
ent, by his own admissions proved that the alleged 
"shortage" of certain sizes was due to the fact that the 
Buehners had diverted some materials from the Church 
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job to an entirely unrelated job. (R. 485-485, 494-495, 
Ab. 68-70). Exhibit 16-D shows that the total tonnage 
used on the Church Office job was only 3,355 tons of 
milk-white quartz aggregate. Marv Allred estimated 
the tonnage was 3,500. (R. 494-495, Ab. 70). 
Buehners also sought to exact another $7,000 by a 
fourth claim by falsely asserting that plaintiff and 
Brimhall delivered a lot of materials in excess of the 
Brimhall purchase order; that defendant paid Clark 
Tank Lines $7,000 for hauling such excess materials 
(R. 716), when the Buehners knew they had contracted 
the hauling away of those additional materials. The 
Buehners tried to "add insult to injury" by urging in 
court a fictitious claim that jilaintiff had "damaged" 
defendant for the delivery charges of Clark Tank Lines 
which the Buehners had secretly contracted. The fic-
titious claims of $14,000 for "damages" which Buehners 
injected into the case, further discredit all of defend-
ants' testimony in any possible conflict with plaintiff's 
evidence. 
In addition to the other reversible errors herein-
above discussed, the trial court was misled into prejud-
icial error by defendants in paragraph 7 of the findings 
of fact. Thereby the court condoned defendant's un-
lawful price-fixing of $20.50 per ton for 4,000 tons of 
plaintiff's aggregate. That was below plaintiff's own 
price quotations, and even below plaintiff's costs. Even 
if plaintiff could have been pressured into consenting, 
any such agreement would have been illegal and void 
and unenforceable under the Unfair Practices Act and 
Title 50, Chapter 1. Although Exhibit 19-P was made 
by Brimhall and defendants adversely to plaintiff's 
rights and interests, the court in effect made plaintiff 
60 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a party thereto, in disregard of the Statute of Frauds 
and the Parol Evidence Rule. The court without the 
consent of plaintiff, contrary to law, further amended 
the illegal purchase order to allow defendants to take 
additional quantities of plaintiff's aggregate for other 
jobs whenever they pleased, at defendants' illegally 
dictated price-below-cost of $20.50 per ton, for the 
eventual financial destruction of plaintiff as a com-
petitor. The court utterly disregarded the fact that 
defendants never complied with even one of the four 
conditions specified by plaintiff to refrain from bring-
ing suit. Notwithstanding plaintiff was put to substan-
tial expense to obtain the information as to defendants' 
overreaching and spurious damage claims, the court 
even denied plaintiff interest. 
The $17,132.85 purportedly "tendered into court" 
at the end of the trial was not a valid tender, for it 
was based on defendants' below cost illegal offer of 
$20.50 a ton, and it could not be accepted under the 
Unfair Practices Act, because it would be illegal to do 
so. (R. 651, 658, Ab. 94-95). There was no tender or 
deposit in court under Rule 67 or Rule 68, for no money 
was deposited or placed under the control of the court. 
Instead, a corporate check dated June 6, 1973, of Otto 
Buehner & Company for that amount without interest 
payable to D. W. Brimhall and American Aggregate 
Company was left with the clerk. (Ab. 139). Defend-
ants attempted to force plaintiff to bargain with Brim-
hall, and to cut off plaintiff's right of appeal, if 
possible. 
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CONCLUSION 
Independent of all other evidence we believe de-
fendants themselves proved their guilt of a conspiracy 
to defraud plaintiff, a conspiracy for illegal price fix-
ing in restraint of trade and commerce to the injury and 
loss of plaintiff, illegal unfair competition and unfair 
trade practices. 
Paragraphs 1 and 6 of the judgment which erron-
eously dismiss plaintiff's complaint with prejudice and 
deny plaintiff costs, should be reversed and vacated. 
Defendants never complied with any of the four con-
ditions plaintiff named for refraining from suing 
defendants. 
Therefore, on its First Claim, since plaintiff's 
quoted price was $29.50 per ton for selected sizes, and 
defendants induced Brimhall to accept in his own name 
Exhibit 19-P whereby Otto Buehner & Company was 
to get plaintiff's aggregate at defendants' dictated 
pirce of $20.50 per ton in violation of the Unfair Prac-
tices Act, Title 13, Chapter 5, and of the statute against 
price fixing and restraint of trade, Title 50, Chapter 1, 
the plaintiff is justly entitled to the difference of $9 
per ton on 4,000 tons or $36,000 whereby defendants 
unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves. If treble 
damages are not allowed under Title 50, Chapter 1, 
punitive damages should be awarded inasmuch as 
plaintiff was subjected to substantial loss of time and 
attorney fees in investigations to extract the necessary 
information and to obtain an adjudication. 
On the Second Claim plaintiff is entitled to $35 a 
ton for 259 tons or $9,065 principal. On the Third 
Claim plaintiff is entitled to $35 a ton less the stipu-
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lated transportation cost of $7.55 per ton or $27.45 per 
ton or $25,061.85. Plaintiff claims a right to interest 
on all principal amounts from the dates of the taking 
of plaintiff's aggregate. 
PAUL ET^REIMANN 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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A P P E N D I X A 
Excerpts from the Utah Unfair Practices Act, 
Title 13, Chapter 5, U.C.A., 1953, deemed material 
to this case: 
13-5-17. Policy of act.—The legislature de-
clares that the purpose of this act is to safeguard 
the public against the creation and perpetuation 
of monopolies and to foster and encourage com-
petition, by prohibiting unfair and discrimina-
tory practices by which fair and honest competi-
tion is destroyed or prevented. . . . 
13-5-3. Unlawful discrimination.— (a) That 
it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in 
commerce, in the course of such commerce, either 
directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price be-
tween different purchasers of commodities of 
like grade and quality, where either or any of 
the purchasers involved in such discrimination 
are in commerce, where such commodities are 
sold for use, consumption or resale within the 
State of Utah, and where the effect of such dis-
crimination may be substantially to lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly in any line 
of commerce, or to injure, destroy or prevent 
competition with any person who either grants 
or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrim-
ination, or with customers of either of them; pro-
vided, that nothing herein contained shall prevent 
differentials which make only due allowance for 
differences in the cost of manufacture, sale or 
delivery resulting from the different methods or 
quantities in which such commodities are to such 
purchasers sold or delivered;. . . 
(f) That it shall be unlawful for any person 
engaged in commerce, in the course of such com-
merce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrim-
ination in price which is prohibited by this sec-
tion. 
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13-5-6. Violations, agents liable with principal. 
—Any person who either as director, officer or 
agent of any firm or corporation or as agent of 
any person, violating the provisions of this act, 
assists or aids directly or indirectly, in such viola-
tion shall be responsible therefor equally with the 
person, firm or corporation for whom or for 
which he acts. 
13-5-7. Sales, less than cost.— (a) It is here-
by declared that any advertising, offer to sell, or 
sale of any merchandise, either by retailer or 
wholesalers, at less than cost as defined in this 
act, with the intent and purpose of inducing the 
purchase of other merchandise or otherwise in-
juring a competitor, impairs and prevents fair 
competition, injures public welfare, and is unfair 
competition contrary to public policy and the 
policy of this act and is declared to be a viola-
tion of this act. 
(b) 1. When used in this act, the term "cost" 
as applied to production shall include the cost of 
raw materials, labor, and all overhead expenses 
of the producer. 
13-5-13. Contracts in violation declared illegal. 
—Any contract, expressed or implied, made by 
any person, in violation of any of the provisions 
of this act is declared to be an illegal contract 
and no recovery thereon shall be had. 
13-5-15. Penalty for violations of act.—Any 
person, whether as principal, agent, officer or 
director, for himself, or itself or for another per-
son, who shall violate any of the provisions of 
this act, is guilty of a misdemeanor for each 
single violation. . . ." (Italics added). 
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A P P E N D I X B 
Exhibit 34-P 
17 East 6150 South 
Murray, Utah 84107 
July 28, 1971 
Cannon, Duffin and Howe 
Attorneys at Lae 
Dear Mr. Duff in: 
In answer to your letter of June 17,1971. 
The letter from Mr. Paul E. Reiman must not have 
been included as it didn't accompany your letter. 
You stated they are demanding $35.00 per ton, when 
purchase order was for $20.50. Purchase Order # U 
09868, Job # 9-267 was for the job I negotiated for. 
Approximately 4,000 ton for the Church office building. 
As to the material in question, I will state the proceed-
ings as they occurred. Mr. Paul Buehner called me, 
D. W. Brimhall, and said he would need possibly 700 
tons for another job. I told him I had no authority to 
sell or quote a price on material for any other job or 
jobs and that he would have to negotiate with Mr. Don 
Reiman. 
After my conversation with Mr. Paul Buehner, I called 
Mr. Don Reiman and informed him that Mr. Buehner 
had called and would need possibly 700 tons for an-
other job and that I had told Mr. Buehner to contact 
him. 
In regard to the check made out for the total. This 
check was mailed to me and when I received it, I 
called Mr. Paul Buehner and reminded him of the past 
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discussions with him, and that I would return thecheck. 
I gave instructions for the check to be returned and I 
returned to my job in Manila, Utah. The check was 
not mailed and we left for a month vacation. We did 
not return until July 25, when we received your letter. 
The check is being returned today. 
This matter, for whatever additional material was used, 
will have to be worked out by Mr. Buehner and Mr. 
Reiman. 
If I can be of any further assistance, Please let me 
know 
Yours truly, 
D. W. B R I M H A L L 
cc: P .E. Reimann 
cc. American Agg. 
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